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THE "SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES" AND THE INTERNATIONAL
FORUM OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: EVOLVING COMPONENTS
OF THE NEW BRETTON WOODS II POST-GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
ARCHITECTURE AND ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF AD HOC GLOBAL




Beginning in the latter part of 2007, the proposed establish-
ment of Chinese' and Russian
2 Sovereign Wealth Funds ("SWFs")
3
* SJD, DPhil., LLD. James L. Walsh Distinguished Faculty Fellow and
Professor of Financial Institutions Law, SMU Dedman School of Law, and
formerly Sir John Lubbock Professor of Banking Law, University of
London (1993-2004). The author expresses his sincerest appreciation to
Dean John B. Attanasio and the SMU Dedman School of Law for providing
generous research grant support for the article.
1 On September 29, 2007, the People's Republic of China ("PRC") Ministry
of Finance established the China Investment Corporation ("CIC") as a
wholly-owned state corporation under the PRC Company Law by issuing
RMB 1.55 trillion of special bonds that in turn were used to acquire $200
billion of PRC Central Bank foreign exchange reserves. See China
Investment Corporation, Overview, http://www.china-inv.cncicen/about_
cic/aboutcic overview.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2009). The CIC states that
it maintains a "strict commercial orientation." Id. For further discussion of
the CIC see generally Hong Li, China Investment Corporation: A
Perspective on Accountability, 43 INT'L LAW. 1495 (2009). In December
2009, it appeared that the CIC would be funded with an additional $200
billion capital injection. Karen Yip & Mao Lijun, Sovereign Wealth Fund
May Get $200b Cash Injection, CHINADAILY.COM.CN, Dec. 22, 2009,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2009-12/22/content 9211206.htm.
It should be noted that when considering China's sovereign investments
there are a range of entities in China (at the national, provincial and local
levels, including Chinese military-controlled entities) that could be
considered as investing "sovereign funds," and, at times, as competing
against one another. For purposes of the timeframe for this article, it should
also be noted that China's plans for a formal SWF go back to at least March
2007, when a Chinese investment corporation announced its acquisition of a
non-voting equity interest in the Blackstone group with a view to transfer
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sparked considerable governmental, intergovernmental and private
financial and business sector interest in, and countervailing concerns
as to, SWFs. This concern evolved into a growing realization that the
cumulative asset size of SWFs was beginning to represent an
increasingly significant (though not yet systemically significant)
component of the international capital markets.4 This significance
became further magnified when one considered the separate but
related proliferation of other state-owned entities operating and
this interest to its SWF, which was in the process of being formed. See
MICHAEL F. MARTIN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CRS REPORT
FOR CONGRESS: CHINA'S SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND 1 (2008).
2 The Russian Federation established a "Stabilization Fund" in 2004.
Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, About the Fund,
http://www.minfin.ru/en/stabfund/about/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2010). In
2008, the Russian Ministry of Finance split this Fund into two separate
funds: the Reserve Fund and the National Well-Being Fund. Andrew E.
Kramer, Russia Creates $32 Billion Fund for Foreign Investment, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 2008, at C2. The Reserve Fund accumulates federal budget
revenues from the production and export of oil, natural gas, and oil
products. Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, Mission of Reserve
Fund, http://wwwl.minfin.ru/en/reservefund/mission/ (last visited Mar. 10,
2010). The National Well-Being Fund (which many consider a SWF) was
originally capitalized with $32 billion, is intended to provide long-term
support for the Federation's pension system, and is authorized to invest in
foreign stocks and bonds. Kramer, supra.
3 For extensive background material on SWFs, see generally International
Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IWG), http://www.iwg-
swf.org/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2009); Peterson Institute for International
Economics, Hot Topics for SWFs, http://www.iie.com/research/topics/
hottopic.cfm?HotTopiclD-11 (last visited Dec. 1, 2009); Sovereign Wealth
Fund Institute, http://swfinstitute.org/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2009); Sovereign
Wealth Fund News, http://www.sovereignwealthfundsnews.com/ (last
visited Dec. 1, 2009).
4 By the end of 2009, the SWF Institute estimated that there were in excess
of fifty SWFs owned by over thirty countries/jurisdictions with total assets
aggregating to around $3.8 trillion. See SWF Institute, Fund Rankings,
http://www.swfinstitute.org/funds.php (last visited Dec. 1, 2009). The IMF
estimates these SWF assets could grow to between $6-10 trillion by 2013.
INT'L MONETARY FUND, MONETARY & CAPITAL MKTS. & POLICY DEP'T &
REVIEW DEP'TS, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS-A WORK AGENDA 6 (2008),
available at http://imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2008/022908.pdf [hereinafter
WORK AGENDA].
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investing globally. 5 In addition, in the latter part of 2007, the U.S.
and global financial sectors began to generate heightened investment
interest in these SWFs because they helped to shore-up fragile global
financial institutions6 when the current Global Financial Crisis
("GFC") began to rear its head.7 Even intergovernmental develop-
ment institutions came to see SWFs as possible engines for selective
economic development financings. 8 Yet, this positive interest in
SWFs also precipitated corresponding political ambivalence and
outright concerns in various countries over possible untoward
geopolitical, national foreign investment and national security
implications to which a fundamental shift in global financial and
economic markets (i.e., a perceived rise in "Global State
Capitalism") might give rise.9
5 See, e.g., Joshua Kurlantzick, State Inc., BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 16, 2008, at
IE.
6 See, e.g., Bernardo Bortolotti et al., Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment
Patterns and Performance l(Working Paper, Apr. 6, 2009), available at
http://web.econ.unito.it/bortolotti/articles/SWF-Investment-pattems-
perform-FIN-apr069.pdf. As the GFC intensified in the second half of 2008,
most of the SWFs backed off from investing in troubled Western financial
institutions. See id. at 6 n.6.
7 See, e.g., ALEX PATELIS, MERRILL LYNCH, GLOBAL ECONOMICS: MORE
ON SWFs 1-2 (2007) (showcasing the high level of investor interest in
SWFs during late 2007). For purposes of this article, it is important to note,
in terms of timeline, that in 2007 and the first part of 2008, the U.S.
Treasury and the G7 Finance Ministers did not fully appreciate the
impending scope and depth of the current GFC, which really accelerated
with the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. See, e.g., Marl
Lieberman, Paulson's Track Record Not So Strong on Facts, Fox Bus.,
Sept. 24, 2008, http://www.foxbusiness.com/story/markets/economy/
paulsons-track-record-strong-facts/. For background information on the
GFC see generally Douglas W. Amer, The Global Credit Crisis of 2008:
Causes and Consequences, 43 INT'L LAW. 91 (2009).
8 See, e.g., Press Release, The World Bank, Sovereign Wealth Funds Should
Invest in Africa, Zoellick Says (Apr. 2, 2008) available at http://go.World
bank.org/50LXBPOUMO.
9 See GERALD LYONS, STANDARD CHARTERED BANK, STATE CAPITALISM:
THE RISE OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 1 (2007), available at https:/
research. standardchartered.com/researchdocuments/Pages/ResearchArticle.a
spx?&R-50729; BRAD W. SETSER, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
SOVEREIGN WEALTH AND SOVEREIGN POWER 39-40 (2008), available at
http://www.cfr.org/publication/17074/sovereign wealth and
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This emergence of the current "SWF phenomena" has
generated a virtual "cottage industry" for legal and finance scholars,
business, finance and political commentators and policy think tanks,
spawning a plethora of reports, scholarly articles and news stories. 10
Topical SWF areas of specific legal interest have included a range of
diverse matters such as national security regulation,'' foreign direct
investment ("FDI") approaches,12 international taxation,13 corporate14
governance, sovereign immunity1 5 and possible World Trade Orga-
nization/General Agreement on Trade and Services ("WTO/GATS")
implications.16 This article, however, does not intend to retrace either
sovereignpower.html; The Invasion of the Sovereign-Wealth Funds,
EcoNoMiST, Jan. 19, 2008, at 11.
10 See, e.g., Edwin M. Truman, Remarks at the American Enterprise
Institute: Do Sovereign Wealth Funds Pose a Risk to the United States?,
Feb. 28, 2008, available at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.
cfm?ResearchID-892.
1 ISee Sovereign Wealth Fund Acquisitions and Other Foreign Government
Investments in the United States: Assessing the Economic and National
Security Implications Before S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Edwin M. Truman, Senior Fellow,
Peterson Inst. for Int'l Econ.), available at http://www.iie.com/publications/
papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID-842; Daniella Markheim, Heritage Lectures:
Sovereign Wealth Funds and U.S. National Security (Feb. 7, 2008), in
Heritage Foundation Lectures No. 1063, Mar. 6, 2008, at 4-5, available at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/tradeandeconomicfreedom/hl 1063.cfm.
12 See, e.g., Justin O'Brien, Barriers to Entry: Foreign Direct Investment
and the Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 42 INT'L LAW. 1231 (2008).
13 See, e.g., Michael S. Knoll, Taxation and the Competitiveness of
Sovereign Wealth Funds: Do Taxes Encourage Sovereign Wealth Funds to
Invest in the United States? (Univ. of Pa., Working Paper, Feb. 10, 2009),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id 1342510.
14 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Sovereign Wealth Funds
and Corporate Governance: A Minimalist Response to the New
Mercantilism, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1345 (2008).
15 See, e.g., Bart De Meester, International Legal Aspects of Sovereign
Wealth Funds: Reconciling International Economic Law and the Law of
State Immunities with a New Role of the State (Institute for International
Law, University of Leuven, Working Paper No. 18, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id 1308542.
16 See Aaditya Mattoo & Arvind Subramanian, Currency Undervaluation
and Sovereign Wealth Funds: A New Role for the World Trade
Organization (Peterson Inst. for Int'l Econ., Working Paper Series, Paper
No. 08-2, 2008), available at http://www.petersoninstitute.org/
publications/wp/wpO8-2.pdf.
Vol. 29
2009-2010 "SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES" & SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 469
a general policy analysis or any specific legal analyses of SWFs.
Instead, it critiques the ad hoc processes (international, domestic and
industry-based) surrounding the establishment of the International
Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds ("IWG") 17 of twenty-six
IMF member countries having SWFs for the purpose of formulating
the SWF-related "Generally Accepted Principles and Practices"
(Santiago Principles or "GAPP"). 8 The article likewise critiques the
subsequent creation in April 2009 of a permanent standing group
under the so-called Kuwait Declaration, the International Forum of
Sovereign Wealth Funds ("ISWF Forum") for continuing and
expanding upon the IWG-ISWF Forum process.1 9 The primary
17 See International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, http://
www.iwg-swf.org/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2009). The first meeting of the
IWG, which occurred on May 1, 2008, included twenty five member
countries with SWFs:
Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Botswana, Canada, Chile,
China, Equatorial Guinea, Iran, Ireland, South Korea,
Kuwait, Libya, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Qatar,
Russia, Singapore, Timor-Leste, Trinidad & Tobago, the
United Arab Emirates, the United States, and Vietnam.
U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON INT'L ECON. &
EXCH. RATE POLICIES; Sovereign Wealth Funds, at 2, 2. n.3 (May 2008),
available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/international-affairs/economic-
exchange-rates/. Additionally, Saudi Arabia, the OECD and the World
Bank "participate[d] as permanent observers." Id. at 2 n.3.
18 See INT'L WORKING GROUP OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, SOVEREIGN
WEALTH FUNDS: GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES
"SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES" 4 (2008), available at http://www.iwg-swf.org/
pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf [hereinafter SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES] ("The
purpose of the GAPP is to identify a framework of generally accepted
principles and practices that properly reflect appropriate governance and
accountability arrangements as well as the conduct of investment practices
by SWFs on a prudent and sound basis.").
19 See International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds, http://www.
ifswf.org/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2009) ("IFSWF is a voluntary group of
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs), which will meet, exchange views on
issues of common interest, and facilitate an understanding of the Santiago
Principles and SWF activities."). Specifically on the Kuwait Declaration,
see International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, "Kuwait
Declaration": Establishment of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth
Funds, http://www.iwg-swf.org/mis kuwaitdec.htm (last visited Sept. 13,
2009). The Forum is currently comprised of the IWG members referred to
above in note 17.
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objective of this critique is to explore how this IWG-ISWF Forum
process (1) can be made more "administratively sound" in terms of
legitimacy, transparency and accountability, and (2) can be made
more relevant to the current reconfiguration of the global financial
system that is underway under the guidance of the Group of 7 ("G7")
Finance Ministers, the Group of 20 ("G20") Finance Ministers and
the Heads of State ("Leaders"). 0 In effect, this article addresses the
subject matter of SWFs from the vantage point of the proliferation of
"global administrative networks" in the international economic and
financial law area.2'
20 For present purposes it should be understood that until recently the
primary global policy determiners were the Heads of State of the G7 leading
industrialized countries (in the mid 1990s, the G7 was expanded at the
Leaders level to include Russia). However, the G7 Finance Ministers
continued to meet as the G7 and not with Russia. In 1999, a G20 group of
Finance Ministers (including the G7 countries and additional leading
developed and emerging/developing economies) was formed to provide
assistance, when requested, by the G7 Finance Ministers and/or G7/8
Leaders. It was not until November 2009 that the first G20 Leaders meeting
was held to consider the GFC. At the September 2009 G20 Leaders meeting
in Pittsburgh, it was announced that, after the combined G7/8-G20 meeting
in Canada in 2010, the G20 framework (at both the Leaders and Finance
Ministers levels) would replace the former G7/8 framework. For detailed
records on the G7, G8 and G20, see the unofficial website maintained by the
University of Toronto, Munk Centre for International Studies at Trinity
College, G8 Information Centre, http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/ (last visited
Dec. 1, 2009).
21 In 1995, 1 wrote a treatise on the informal "soft law" development of
international financial rules and standards. JOSEPH JUDE NORTON, DEVISING
INTERNATIONAL BANK SUPERVISORY STANDARDS (1995); see also, Joseph
J. Norton, Comment on the Developing Transnational Network(s) in the
Area of International Financial Regulation, 43 INT'L LAW. 175 (2009).
Others began to expand this soft law concept into an "international network
concept." See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER
(2004). More generally, in 2005, an ongoing research project was com-
menced at the Institute for International Law and Justice at the NYU School
of Law respecting "Global Administrative Law." See Benedict Kingsbury,
Nico K-risch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Admini-
strative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005); Institute for
International Law and Justice, Website of the Global Administrative Law
Project, www.iilj.org/GAL (last visited Dec. 1, 2009). This article does not
argue that the Santiago Principles (GAPP) and the related IWG-ISWF
Forum process comprise a form of "soft law"; discussions of "soft law" tend
to end up at worst in a conceptual quagmire and at best in inconclusiveness.
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This article's initial point is that the grouping of various
SWFs and regulators under the IWG-ISWF Forum process is not a
true voluntary association, but rather one that was constructively
"pressured" into existence. The formation of the grouping was
constructively pressured initially by the then U.S. Secretary of the
Treasury, Henry J. Paulson, operating reactively and directly. It was
then pressured domestically through the Treasury, and then globally
through the G7 Finance Ministers, the International Monetary and
Finance Committee ("IMFC") of the IMF and the Organization of
Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD"). Finally, the
grouping was pressured on a bilateral basis by selective countries
having SWFs (e.g., Abu Dhabi and Singapore) in an attempt to
"prime" and to shape a broader global IWG approach. Yet, notwith-
standing this rather strained, ad hoc and haphazard genealogy of the
IWG process, this article proposes that there is a broader and more
meaningful long-term role for the IWG and the Santiago Principles.
This role can be best fulfilled if the IWG and the Santiago Principles
can be "administratively" enhanced and effectively linked into the
new "Bretton Woods II" framework for the global financial system,
as is being called for by the G7 and G20.
22
First, in Part Ii, this article considers generally the subject of
the SWF and shows that SWFs are not by nature or conduct a
homogenous or cohesive group. Next, in Part III, the article
addresses the domestic processes that led up to the formulation of the
Santiago Principles. In this context, Part III considers how various
United States governmental bodies-the U.S. Treasury, Congress,
the U.S. bank and investment securities regulators, the relevant U.S.
national security bodies and the American polity-dealt with the
SWF phenomenon during 2007-2008. Part III likewise addresses
how the international events surrounding the IWG and the Santiago
Principles unfolded. In Part IV, this article analyzes the nature and
import of the IWG and the Santiago Principles. Finally, in Part V,
this article presents brief concluding observations, including the
recommendation that the IWG-ISWF Forum process needs to
become integrated into the G20 "Bretton Woods II" reconfiguration
of the global financial and economic systems, particularly bringing
Rather, this article observes that the GAPP has developed into a type of
"rule-making" process that is designed to impact the operation and decision
making of SWFs on an ongoing basis. For further discussion, see infra Part
IV.B.3.
22 See infra Part V.
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the ISWF Forum under the umbrella of the most recently restructured
Financial Stability Board ("FSB").23 Part V also suggests that the
FSB and ISWF Forum linkage needs also to be better coordinated
with the developmental (World Bank) and trade (World Trade
Organization ("WTO")) pillars of the impending Bretton Woods II
framework.
II. Background
This section provides basic context for the subsequent
analysis of the IWG-ISWF Forum process and the formulation of the
Santiago Principles and the Kuwait Declaration.
A. Sovereign Wealth Funds: What are we really
talking about?
While not of recent vintage (the first SWFs go back to the
1950s)24 and while retrospectively it has been estimated that by 2000
there were twenty SWFs managing approximately $500 billion in
assets on a global basis,2 the term "Sovereign Wealth Fund" itself
23 For background information on the FSB, see Financial Stability Board,
www.fmancialstabilityboard.org (last visited Mar. 11, 2010) and discussion
in infra Part V.
24 The first SWFs go back to the 1950s (e.g., Kuwait and the Micronesia
atolls of Kirabati, the former Gilbert Islands). See Simon Johnson, The Rise
of Sovereign Wealth Funds, FIN. & DEV., Sept. 2007, at 56, 56, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2007/09/straight.htm. The SWF
of Abu Dhabi and Singapore go back to the 1970s and the Western "gold
standard" SWF of Norway goes back to the early 1990s. The State of
Alaska and certain Canadian Provinces also had SWFs dating back to the
1970s. Might I suggest anecdotally that my State of Texas established in its
Constitution in 1876 the first prototype SWF, a commodity (oil reserve)
based Fund, now with $15 billion in assets, to support its state universities.
Also, one commentator conjures that the French established the first SWF in
1816. Philipp Hildebrand, Vice-Chairman, Governing Bd. of the Swiss
Nat'l Bank, The Challenge of Sovereign Wealth Funds 2 (Dec. 18, 2007),
available at www.bis.org/review/r071219d.pdf (citing Benoit Coeur6 in
note 4).
25 See Sovereign Wealth Fund Acquisitions and Other Foreign Government
Investments in the U.S. Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter McCormick (2007)] (David
H. McCormick, Under Secretary for International Affairs, U.S. Department
of the Treasury), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?
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does not appear to have been coined until the 2005-2006 period26 and
did not enter the common public vocabulary until the first half of
2007.27 The absence of public attention directed toward SWFs until
most recently is the result, in part, of the fact that these funds were
not considered individually or collectively to be of major signifi-
cance to world financial markets. But, particularly over the past
decade, fundamental global economic and trade imbalances-in
foreign exchange reserves, oil and other commodity prices-have
resulted in countries (particularly emerging market countries) run-
ning large and increasing current account surpluses. 28 The attendant
shift in net capital outflows generated investment income and more
significantly created a new global paradigm, which reflects signifi-
cant shifts of wealth from the developed countries to the emerging
29market countries.
In the 2005-2006 period, it seems that a number of domestic
regulators worldwide-both domestic Central Banks and national
Finance Ministries-began to ponder the best use of what was
becoming "excessive" reserve holdings to protect their country's
exchange rate regimes. It is within these discrete aspects of Central
Bank functions that the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") first
considered the subject matter of SWFs in a 2005 report.3 ° In addition,
around this time, global private financial institutions began to
FuseAction-Files.View&FileStore id-c261562a-6566-440b-bO6a-03e89c
14028a; Johnson, supra note 24, at 56.
26 Andrew Rozanov, then a senior manager at State Street Global Advisors,
is credited with first coining the term "Sovereign Wealth Funds" in a short
article he wrote in 2005. See Andrew Rozanov, Who Holds the Wealth of
Nations?, 15 CENT. BANKING J., May 2005, at 52, 52-53.
27 It's fair to say that if one were to do a timeline Google search on
"Sovereign Wealth Fund," "Sovereign Investment Fund," "Sovereign Fund"
and "SWF" pre-2007, one would come up with barely a "hit." Post 2006,
however, one now would find thousands of entries.
21 See, e.g., Sir John Gieve, Deputy Governor, Bank of Eng., Speech to the
Sovereign Wealth Management Conference: Sovereign Wealth Funds and
Global Imbalances 2 (Mar. 14, 2008), available athttp://www.bis.org/
review/r080319d.pdf. It is worth noting that our UK counterparts at the
Bank of England appear to be quite positive about SWFs. See id. at 6
(listing the positive effects of SWFs).
29 See id. at 2-3.
30 See ANTONIO GALICIA-ESCOTTO, IMF COMMITTEE ON BALANCE OF
PAYMENT STATISTICS, ISSUES PAPER (RESTEG) #5: INVESTMENT FUNDS 1
(2005), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/bop/pdf/resteg5.pdf.
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develop significant databases and business strategies that deal with
methods of advising governments and others about alternative usages
of these excess reserves. 31 Certainly in 2007-when the Russian
Government began to seriously consider capping and restructuring its
existing Oil Stabilization Fund and creating a new National Well-
Being Fund with the increasing excess reserves, and, when China
signed asset management contracts with twenty external investment
managers regarding the contemplated creation of the China Invest-
ment Corporation ("CIC"), the global public radar screen was
activated, and the public and private financial sectors began to realize
the structural significance of what was occurring in the global
32financial system.
Historically, SWFs have operated on a discrete, long-term
perspective and on a non- or low-leveraged, commercial investment
basis; though, there appears to be no common investment strategy
among the SWFs and, in light of the current GFC, certain SWFs may
well be changing their strategies and objectives.33 But, for the most
part and until very recently, SWFs have operated individually and
largely below the public radar: they were not viewed yet as
significant players in terms of the overall world financial markets.34
31 See Rozanov, supra note 26, at 55-56.
32 See China Investment Corporation, supra note 1; Kramer, supra note 2.
33 That being said, when the Kuwaiti Fund acquired over a twenty percent
equity stake in British Petroleum in the late 1980s, Mrs. Thatcher and her
conservative government pushed this investment into the public arena and
backed the Fund down to a 9.9 percent interest based upon UK govern-
mental concern that an oil producing state could unduly influence one of the
world's largest oil companies. We Really Must Insist, TIME, Oct. 17, 1988,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/printout/0,8816,968689,00. html. This
author was at the University of London in 1988 and it is his anecdotal
recollection that there was considerable "chatter" that Mrs. Thatcher
intuitively bristled at having just privatized BP only to have a state-
controlled entity try to acquire such a large equity position. The rumor that
Kuwait was going to try to acquire up to a thirty percent interest in part to
force BP divestiture from apartheid South Africa did not sit well with Mrs.
Thatcher either.
34 See WORK AGENDA, supra note 4, at 8. The author estimates, based on
various reports over the past two years of the McKinsey Global Institute
(http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/publications/), the IMF, the World Bank,
the OECD and the BIS, that the significance of SWFs in the global financial
market is as follows: For comparative purposes, World GDP in 2009 is
estimated at approximately $60 trillion (with US GDP around $14 trillion),
and at 2008 world financial assets were estimated at approximately $178
Vol. 29
2009-2010 "SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES" & SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 475
Further, there has been no substantiated evidence that SWFs have
ever brought mischief to the international financial system.35 Nor has
there been any firm evidence that there is any necessary connection
between an SWF's establishment and the nature of a country's
political system; 36 that there is any one-size-fits-all structure for
SWFs; 37 or that SWFs have operated in a non-commercial, political
manner or have any current plans to do so.38 Moreover, although
current public interest in SWFs arose with the unfolding of the GFC
and the increasing number and size of SWFs, SWFs have not been
considered, to date, as operating as a financial industry group or in
any way contributing to the causes of the GFC. To the contrary,
various SWFs came to be looked upon as potential sources of needed
trillion. In 2008, approximately $1.4 trillion of assets were under hedge fund
management; private equity funds were at $.9 trillion; global pensions fund
assets were at $17.9 trillion; global mutual funds were at $19 trillion; global
stock market capitalization was at $45 trillion; global bank deposits were at
approximately $61 trillion; government debt securities were at $32 trillion;
global private debt securities were at $51 trillion; and global insurance
assets were at $16 trillion. Some financial analysts estimate that by 2012,
fifteen SWFs could have assets close to approximately $13-16 trillion (10-
12% of current total global financial assets).
35 See, e.g., Paul D. Marquardt, Sovereign Wealth Funds, http://search.
abanet.org/ (search "Sovereign Wealth Funds"; then click on the hyperlink
entitled "Sovereign Wealth Funds") ("Although SWFs have lately attracted
a great deal of attention, criticism, and concern, much of these exaggerate
the scale and influence of SWFs and posit threats that are largely
speculative.").
36 See, e.g., Brad Setser, Council on Foreign Relations, Regulating
Sovereign Wealth Funds: Does the US Have Any Leverage (Feb. 26, 2008),
http://www.cfr.org/ (follow "Think Tank Home" hyperlink; then follow
"Muarice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies" hyperlink; then
follow "Brad Setser: Follow the Money" hyperlink; then follow "February
2008" hyperlink; then follow "Regulating sovereign wealth funds: does the
US have any leverage?" hyperlink).
37 See Vidhi Chhaochharia & Luc Laeven, The Investment Allocation of
Sovereign Wealth Funds 9 (Int'l Monetary Fund Working Paper, July 8,
2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id-
1262383; Bortolotti et al., supra note 6, at 5.
38 See Paul Rose, Sovereigns as Shareholders, 87 N.C. L. REv. 83, 87
(2008).
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global capital for fragile global financial institutions and as a positive
force in the search for global financial stability.
39
In looking at the sources of the foreign exchange assets held,
SWF assets can include balance of payment surpluses, surpluses
from official foreign currency operations, proceeds of privatizations,
fiscal surpluses and/or receipts from commodity exports. 40 Generical-
ly, SWFs have come to be categorized as either "commodity funds"
(i.e., from oil and gas reserves, copper, silver or phosphates) or "non-
commodity funds" (i.e., from transfers of assets from "excess"
official exchange reserves). 4 1 Further, the IMF has identified five
types of SWFs according to their primary investment objective:
stabilization funds, savings funds for future generations, reserve
investment corporations, development funds and contingent pension
reserve funds.42 The actual structure of an SWF can vary consider-
ably: from being part of the Central Bank (e.g., the Norwegian Fund)
or the Ministry of Finance (e.g., Kuwaiti Fund) to a separate stand-
alone corporate entity (e.g., China's CIC and Singapore's two funds).
The asset managers of SWFs are free to seek a higher rate of return
than the managers of official reserves whose emphasis is on liquidity
and safety.43 As such, the SWF asset managers will tend to be more
aggressive, risk tolerant and focus on the long-term in their
investment strategies.44 However, in many cases, these managers will
be given a governmental benchmark for expected investment return.
The managers may be drawn from government bureaucrats and/or
private sector fund managers. The ownership, structure and
management of SWFs, with a few exceptions (e.g., the Norwegian
'9 See Tao Sun & Heiko Hesse, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Financial
Stability-An Event Study Analysis 3 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper
No. 09/239, 2009), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/
2009/wp09239.pdf.
40 Udaibir S. Das et al., Setting up a Sovereign Wealth Fund: Some Policy
and Operational Considerations 5 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper
No. 09/179, 2009), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/wp/
2009/wp09179.pdf.
41 See, e.g., SWF Institute, About Sovereign Wealth Funds, http://www.
swfinstitute.org/swf.php (last visited Dec. 1, 2009).
42 Das et al., supra note 40, at 9-10.
43 See Gordon L. Clark & Ashby H.B. Monk, The Oxford Survey of
Sovereign Wealth Funds' Asset Managers 13 (Oxford Univ. Ctr. for the
Env't, Working Paper, July 1, 2009), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id 1432078.
44 See id at 18.
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Fund), give rise to concerns in many public and private corners about
fundamental issues such as transparency, accountability, sound
governance and sound risk management. 45 Satisfactorily addressing
these issues seems to be of mutual concern and benefit to both the
46SWFs and the global financial system.
In sum, the geographic embrace of the SWF is now truly
global, covering countries (large and small) in Western Europe,
Eastern Europe, North America, South America, Central Asia,
Southern Asia, Eastern Asia, Australasia, Africa and the Middle
East.47 Of recent note, Saudi Arabia, which has traditionally invested
country reserves through its Central Banking Authority and Royal
Family accounts, in 2008, established what could become a mega-
fund to rival or exceed Abu Dhabi's. 48 However, with all the current
controversy over SWFs, Saudi Arabia appears to be opting initially
for a mini $5-6 billion SWF, even though its central bank holds very
substantial international assets outside its normal foreign exchange
reserves.49 Even recently, a high-level French government official,
notwithstanding France's concerns over the rise of the non-European
45 See WoRK AGENDA, supra note 4, at 4, 8, 11, 14.
46 See id. at 4.
47 See SWF Institute, SWF Size & Concentration by Country,
http://www.swfinstitute.org/research/worldmapswf.php (last visited Mar.
11, 2010). That being said, it appears the bulk of SWF assets (1) are held by
seven jurisdictions, some having more than one fund (UAE, Norway,
Russia, China, Kuwait, Singapore and Hong Kong); (2) are held by Middle
Eastern and Asian entities; and (3) are commodity-based funds. See SWF
Institute, supra note 4 (showing a table of the largest SWFs indicating, inter
alia, each fund's country of origin and the size and nature of assets under
management).
48 Infra note 49.
49 The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency ("SAMA"), the Saudi central
banking authority, distinguishes on its own books its foreign exchange
reserve assets and its international asset holdings. See Saudi Arabian
Monetary Agency, SAMA Functions, http://www.sama.gov.sa/sites/
SAMAEN/AboutSAMA/Pages/SAMAFunction.aspx (last visited Mar. 12,
2010). Thus, though the SAMA has about $400 billion in international
assets, it is not formally considered a SWF. See SWF Institute, SAMA
Foreign Holdings, http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund/saudi.php (last visited
Mar. 12, 2010). In 2008, the Saudi Government authorized its domestic
Public Investment Fund to establish a SWF in the form of a wholly-owned
investment company (Sanabil). See Gov 't-Owned Sanabil al-Saudia to Start
Ops Next Week, MENAFN.cOM, Apr. 29, 2009, http://www.menafn.com/
qn newsstory s.asp?Storyld- 1093246314.
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SWFs, said she was "seduced" by the idea of France establishing an
SWF, with France subsequently establishing a small Fund.50 From
2008-2009, Brazil and Malaysia also established modest-sized
SWFs.5' Countries as diverse as India and Japan have preliminarily
explored establishing an SWF, but have backed away, at least for the
moment.52
B. The Definitional Quandary
What's in a name? Superficially, the term "Sovereign Wealth
Fund" seems rather straightforward and self-descriptive. But in
reality, arriving at a definitive and generally agreed upon definition
for an SWF has proven elusive, largely because of the lack of
homogeneity among individual SWFs and the current absence of a
recognized cohesive SWF sector in the global financial system. As
50 See Danny Fortson, Economy Minister Admits She Is 'Seduced' by Idea of
French SWF, THE INDEPENDENT, Feb. 19, 2008, http://www.independent.
co.uk/news/business/news/economy-minister-admits-she-is-seduced-by-
idea-of-french-swf-7841 1O.html. In 2008, the French established the FSI
(Fonds Strat~gique D'Investissement) with about $28 billion equivalent. See
SWF Institute, Strategic Investment Fund, http://www.swfinstitute.org/
fund/france.php (last visited Mar. 12, 2010).
51 In 2009, Brazil established a small SWF ($8.6 billion equivalent), the
Fundo Soberano do Brasil. See SWF Institute, Sovereign Fund of Brazil,
http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund/brazil.php (last visited Mar. 12, 2010). In
2008, Malaysia established a small ($3.1 billion) SWF, 1 Malaysia
Development Berhad, a sovereign fund similar to Temesak that apparently
Malaysia does not consider a SWF and is not part of the IWG process. See
SWF Institute, 1 Malaysia Development Berhad, http://www.swfinstitute.
org/fund/terengganu.php (last visited Mar. 12, 2010).
52 On Japan, see Japan Mulling Sovereign Wealth Fund -The Times,
REUTERS, Jan. 26, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUST74196200
80126. However, with strong opposition within Japan's Ministry of Finance
and with a recent change in national government, it does not appear a final
decision has been made. On India, see Gaurav Choudhury, RBINot Keen on
Managing Sovereign Wealth Fund, HINDUSTAN TIMES, Aug. 18, 2008,
http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/businessbankinginsurance/
RBI-not-keen-on-managing-sovereign-wealth-fund/Article 1-332137.aspx.
India's dilemma is that its reserve assets are not commodity based and the
country is still running a current account deficit.
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Andrew Rozanov of the State Street Global Advisors pointed out:
"There is no such thing as a 'typical' sovereign wealth fund ....
Furthermore, the early attempts at an SWF definition have
been at the hands of private investment bankers who were more
concerned with identifying key common functional characteristics-
with the view of creating a broad grouping of funds for potential
client and/or future financial collaborative purposes-even though
SWFs did not have as much in common as the functional grouping
might suggest, since there was very little institutional linkage and
interaction among the "members" of this grouping.5 4 Even when the
policymakers became involved (e.g., the "think tanks," the U.S.
Treasury or the IMF), their attempts at a definition were also
incomplete: rather than being informative from a policy perspective,
they tended to focus on who might supervise and not necessarily on
how to supervise in any substantive manner. 55 Moreover, even given
a range of available definitions, there have occurred a number of
embarrassing circumstances where various funds supposedly inclu-
ded in a definitional group denied being an SWF under the given
definition,56 or where a major jurisdiction has remained aloof from
5' Andrew Rozanov, What is "Sovereign Wealth" Anyway? 3 (Sept. 10,
2009) (unpublished article on file with author).
54 See, e.g., Stephen Jen, Morgan Stanley, Global Economic Forum: The
Definition of Sovereign Wealth Fund (Oct. 26, 2007), http://www.
morganstanley.com/views/gef/archive/2007/20071026-Fri.html; cf INT'L
MONETARY FUND, supra note 4, at 37-38.
55 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Remarks by Acting
Under Secretary for International Affairs Clay Lowery on Sovereign Wealth
Funds and the International Financial System (June 21, 2007) available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp471 .htm [hereinafter Lowery
Speech].
56 For example, in March 2008, Temasek (perceived generally as a SWF)
did not sign on to the Singapore Policy Principles agreement because it did
not consider itself to be a SWF as it has to sell assets to raise funds for new
investments and it does not require government approval. Press Release,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sing., Guidelines to Avoid Investment Friction
Reached (Mar. 22, 2008) available at http://app.mfa.gov.sg/pr/read
content.asp?View,9632. Also, in June 2008, Russian prime Minister retorted
to a comment by U.S. Treasury Secretary Paulson about Russia's SWF that
Russia did not yet have a SWF and Russia's investments in the U.S. were of
a private nature through Russian SOEs/MNEs. See Putin-No Sovereign
Wealth Fund in Russia Yet, REUTERS.cOM, June 30, 2008, http://www.
reuters.com/article/idUSL3028241920080630.
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the IWG process 7 Further, as Part III of this article considers, the
early (and even current) discussions of SWFs get entangled with
broader political and security concerns over foreign state-owned
enterprise ("SOE") investments by certain countries like China,
Russia and a few Middle Eastern nations.
58
Getting back to the matter of an appropriate SWF definition,
Andrew Rozanov, in his 2005 seminal piece, does not attempt any
formal definition.5 9 Instead, he provides a quasi-definition by exclu-
sion, which is in actuality an inclusive definition. He refers to SWFs
as "a different type of public-sector player" that are "neither
traditional public-pension funds nor reserve assets supporting nation-
al currencies, but a different type of entity altogether."6 His
definition is concerned with the sovereign ownership and manage-
ment dimension, and that the assets were not prudential monetary
reserves of traditional pension funds. Rozanov was not concerned
about the legal structure of these funds: he recognized that a central
bank might have legitimate reasons to keep such excess reserves "in-
house" in segregated accounts. 6' He was more concerned about
"excessive reserves" and about exploring the sundry dimensions of
what sovereign wealth management vis-d-vis traditional central bank
functions should be about.62 Though he observed that these funds
often shared one or more common general objectives, he recognized
that countries might have very particularized long-term concerns and
needs that can be impacted by geopolitical and natural disaster
63variants. He acutely states that had Kuwait not accumulated
substantial excess reserves over the decades, it would never have
been able to rebuild its country as it did after the 1991 Gulf War-
Iraqi invasion.64
While acknowledging the great differences among the then-
existing SWFs, Rozanov, recognizing the increasing importance of
57 E.g., Saudi Arabia has chosen not to be a direct member of the IWG
process, but to be a "permanent observer." See INT'L WORKING GROUP OF
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, supra note 18, at 1.
58 See infra Part Ill.
59 See Rozanov, supra note 26, at 52.60 id.
61 Id. at 56-57.
62 See id. at 55-57 (discussing the huge foreign reserves being accumulated
in certain Asian countries and how those governments should use these
reserves).
63 See id. at 57.
64 [d.
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SWFs in terms of size and wealth, felt there was sufficient
commonality within SWFs to merit carving them out as a separate
subject matter for study, particularly as these funds are ultimately
65rooted in the core function of central bank reserve management.
Also, he thought SWFs should be considered as a group in order "to
answer the following question: Are central bank reserve managers-
at least those among them who have accumulated massive foreign
exchange reserves in recent years-starting to act more like
sovereign wealth managers? '66 Interestingly, Rozanov apparently did
not view engaging in only international investments as a
characteristic of an SWF, a feature that subsequent commentators felt
was important as a distinguishing factor. Now with the GFC and also
in light of the political controversy some recent SWF forays have
generated, a number of SWFs are diverting some of their investment
strategy more inward.67
In a recent 2009 article, Rozanov provides both a three-year
68
retrospective and a forward-looking examination. In considering his
original definition, he still likes its broad embrace, while conceding it
does lack precision because the new emphasis is more "rule-based"
to address evolving policy concerns and greater emphasis on
regulation/self-regulation. 69 Rozanov has developed a multiple
liability-based analysis, 70 but still feels the SWF construct remains
not yet fully evolved.7 1 Further, he sees that, in refining the main
definition, a series of sub-definitional challenges arise regarding the
connected issues of transparency, non-commercial motivation and
12reciprocity.
Stephen Jen of Morgan Stanley, another early student of
SWFs, felt there was sufficient overlap between various types of
sovereign funds such that trying to come up with a set general
definition would not be very useful.73 He preferred to use definitions
65Id at 53.
66 Id at 53-54.
67 See e.g., Zhou Xin & Jacqueline Wong, China Wealth Fund Says
Investing in Domestic Banks, REUTERS, Jan. 16, 2009, http://www.reuters.
com/article/idUSPEK28548920090116.
68 Rozanov, supra note 53.
69 See id. at 5.
70 See Andrew Rozanov, A Liability-Based Approach to Sovereign Wealth,
18 CENT. BANKING 37, 37 (2008).
71 Rozanov, supra note 53, at 7.
72 See id at 1, 12-18.
73 Jen, supra note 54.
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74to suit the specific purpose being sought. This being said, he felt an
SWF "needs to have five characteristics: (1) sovereign; (2) high
foreign currency exposure; (3) no explicit liabilities; (4) high risk
tolerance; and (5) long investment horizon. 75 This definitional
approach would exclude most national stabilization funds and all
76national pension reserve funds.
The earliest U.S. Treasury official to enter the SWF
definitional fray was Clay Lowery, then Acting Under Secretary of
the Treasury for International Affairs, who delivered a policy speech
at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco on June 21, 2007. 7 7
While acknowledging that there was no universal definition for an
SWF, he proposed that the term denotes "a government investment
vehicle which is funded by foreign exchange assets, and which
manages those assets separately from official reserves. ' ' This
proposed definition is indeed compact and straightforward, but,
again, it lends itself to numerous interpretative issues, such as
whether Temasek would come within this definition, given the way it
74 See id.
75 Id.
76 Rozanov, supra note 53, at 9.
77 Lowery Speech, supra note 55. As will be picked up upon in Part III of
this article, this speech came on the heels of China's low-key and indirect
announcement in March 2007 to set up an SWF, see supra note 1; though
the speech curiously did not explicitly mention China's CIC, except for a
very brief passing reference to China's and Russia's soon-to-be-established
SWFs. Lowery speech, supra note 55.
78 Lowery speech, supra note 55. Interestingly, in the Treasury's June 13,
2007 Semiannual Report on International Economic and Exchange Rate
Policies, the end of Lowery's definition was extended to include the words:
"of the monetary authorities (the Central Bank and reserve-related functions
of the Finance Ministry)." U.S. TREASURY, SEMIANNUAL REPORT ON
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICIES app. 3, at 1
(2007), available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/intemational-affairs/
economic-exchange-rates/pdf/2007 Appendix-3.pdf. Lowery's earlier def-
inition would have excluded Central bank segregated and specially managed
accounts and specially managed MOF accounts. See id. Thus, it seems that
the Treasury refined Lowery's definition to broaden the scope of SWFs. In
Winter and Spring 2008, the Treasury is still using Lowery's definition. See,
e.g., Robert M. Kimmitt, Public Footprints in Private Markets: Sovereign
Wealth Funds and the World Economy, FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 2008, at
119, 120 [hereinafter Kimmitt, Public Footprints]; Robert M. Kimmitt, In
Praise of Foreign Investment, INT'L ECON., Spring 2008, at 62, 62
[hereinafter Kimmitt, In Praise of Foreign Investment].
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is structured and funded. 79 What is most significant about Lowery's
speech, as will be discussed further in the next Part of this article, is
that the Treasury is raising, for public notice and discussion, the
overriding policy challenge of how "to work to integrate these funds
as smoothly as possible into the international financial system." 80
Picking up quickly on the Treasury's policy signals, Mr.
Edwin M. Truman published a series of policy papers and speeches
and gave Congressional testimony that have been particularly
influential in advancing an informed and evolving policy approach to
the subject matter of SWFs. 8 1 Interestingly, Truman is not bogged
down in the definitional quandary. He views SWFs as part of a
''continuum" in the way governments manage their international
assets-from traditional reserves, to stabilization funds, to SWFs, to
support of SOEs and state-owned financial institutions. 82 While
focusing on international assets, Truman nevertheless recognizes that
some SWFs have domestic investments.83 He also makes the
argument, which has not achieved mainstream acceptance, that
certain government-funded pension funds should be considered
SWFs; although he does make a distinction between non-pension
fund and pension fund SWFs.84 Further, Truman is cognizant that
79 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
80 Lowery Speech, supra note 55.
81 Mr. Edwin M. Truman is a senior economist with the Peterson Institute
for International Economics, former senior economist with the Federal
Reserve System, a former Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Treasury for
International Affairs and a person with very good working connections
within the Financial Stability Board "network." For further biographical
information on Mr. Truman and weblinks to his various policy briefs,
working papers, speeches and Congressional testimony, see Peterson
Institute for International Economics, Senior Research Staff: Edwin M.
Truman, http://www.iie.com/staff/author bio.cfm?author id=122 (last
visited Dec. 29, 2009).
82 EDWIN M. TRUMAN, PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L ECON., SOVEREIGN
WEALTH FUNDS: THE NEED FOR GREATER TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY (POLICY BRIEF No. PB07-6) 4 (2007), available at
http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb07-6.pdf.
8, See EDWIN M. TRUMAN, PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L ECON., A BLUEPRINT
FOR SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND BEST PRACTICES (POLICY BRIEF No. PB08-
3) 1 (2008), available at http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pbO8-3.pdf.
84 See id. at 1, 1 n.3. On treatment of pension funds, see the Santiago
Principles' definition, which only excludes government-employee pension
funds from the definition of an SWF. INT'L WORKING GROUP OF
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, supra note 18, at 3, 3 n.6.
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central banks (e.g., the Saudi Arabian SAMA) may keep segregated
internal accounts for "excessive reserves." 85 Being well aware that
"SWFs take many forms and are designed to achieve a variety of
economic and financial objectives," Truman views SWF as "a des-
criptive term for a separate pool of government-owned or govern-
ment-controlled financial assets that include some international
assets. 86
For Truman, trying to arrive at a narrow, precise definition of
SWF diverts attention from the real issue: devising suitable
governmental policies for the increasing range of government-
controlled international assets.8 7 Truman's bottom line on SWFs is
three-legged: (1) SWFs "do not pose a significant new threat to US
security or economic interests"; (2) SWFs "are one of the many
challenges of global economic and financial change in the 21st
century" that the U.S. needs to appropriately address from a policy
perspective; and (3) the U.S. should continue its efforts to have
SWFs adopt "best practices" while itself not taking a protectionist
approach to SWF regulation. 8 Truman's primary concerns center
around the following policy bases: transparency, accountability and
good governance.89 As an added contribution to the SWF debate in
the 2007-2008 period, Truman (along with his assistant, Doug
Dawson) presents not only a policy "blueprint" for addressing SWF
"best practices," but also proposes a relatively developed "scorecard"
for testing (rating) specific SWFs as to structure, governance,
accountability, transparency and behavior. 90
85 See TRUMAN, supra note 82, at 2.
86 TRUMAN, supra note 83, at 1.
87 See Sovereign Wealth Funds: New Challenges from a Changing
Landscape Before H. Subcomm. On Domestic and International Monetary
Policy, Trade and Technology, 110th Cong. 1 (2008) (statement of Edwin
M. Truman, Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics),
available at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/truman09O8.pdf.
88 The Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Impacts on US Foreign Policy and
Economic Interests Before H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 1-2
(2008) (statement of Edwin M. Truman, Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute
for International Economics), available at http://www.www.piie.com/
publications/papers/truman05O8.pdf.
89 See, e.g., id. at 3.
90 TRUMAN, supra note 83, at 6-13, 17-21.
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In October 2008, the IWG presented the Santiago
Principles.91 After much analysis, debate and honing in on the key
elements of ownership, investments, purposes and objectives,92 the
IWG settled upon the following common definition of SWFs:
SWFs are defined as special purpose investment
funds or arrangements, owned by the general
government. Created by the general government for
macroeconomic purposes, SWFs hold, manage, or
administer assets to achieve financial objectives, and
employ a set of investment strategies which include
investing in foreign financial assets. The SWFs are
commonly established out of balance of payments
surpluses, official foreign currency operations, the
proceeds of privatizations, fiscal surpluses, and/or
receipts resulting from commodity exports.93
By footnote, the IWG points out that "the intention is not to exclude
all assets on the books of central banks: SWFs can be on the books of
central banks if they also are held for purposes other than balance of
payments purposes (e.g., as intergenerational wealth transfer). 94
This definition, however, does exclude "inter alia, foreign currency
reserve assets held by monetary authorities for the traditional balance
of payments or monetary policy purposes, operations of state-owned
enterprises in the traditional sense, government-employee pension
funds, or assets managed for the benefit of individuals." 95 For the
moment, the Santiago definition can be considered the definitive one
but perhaps not the last word.
III. The Multi-track Road to Santiago and Kuwait City: The
U.S. Domestic Network Track
By the Spring of 2007, the increasing number and projected
increasing size of SWFs have begun to push SWFs to the forefront of
91 See INT'L WORKING GROUP OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, supra note
18.
92 Id. at 27.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 27 n.42.
9' Id. at 27. The reference to "benefit of individuals" would refer to accounts
held for the rulers of various Kingdoms in Middle East or elsewhere.
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the international financial scene, to the research attention of
academia and the investment banking world, and to the policy
96attention of the U.S. Treasury. In part, as alluded to above, this
heightened level of governmental and intergovernmental concern and
interest is also attributable to China's and Russia's plans to establish
SWFs.97 This Part III of the article addresses and analyzes, from a
domestic U.S. context, the events from Spring of 2007 and beyond
that led to the promulgation of the Santiago Principles in October
2008 and the subsequent Kuwait Declaration in April 2009, which
established the ISWF Forum. Part IV of this article will consider the
related and interconnected "international track." The story that
unfolds is one of an informal process that is largely driven by the
U.S. Treasury (in particular by then Secretary Paulson) along a series
of interconnected tracks and involving an ad hoc administrative
network-domestically, bilaterally and multilaterally.
A. In General
From a U.S. perspective, SWF concerns get translated into
"post-9/1 1" security issues and trade/investment protectionism issues
due to the fact that certain countries (e.g., Middle Eastern countries
and China), through SWFs, SOEs or otherwise, are investing
(directly or indirectly) in what some Americans might consider
"sensitive" areas-such as port authorities (e.g., Dubai Ports World's
failed attempt to take over P&O's port business in the U.S. even
though preliminarily cleared in advance by the Committee on
Foreign Investment in the United States ("CFIUS"))98 and energy
industries (e.g., CNOOC's, a Chinese SOE, failed attempts to
acquire Unocal). These two examples, which involved SOEs and not
SWFs, provide evidence for the "politicization of the CFIUS
process," albeit through different contexts: the Dubai Ports World
because its Middle East base in the United Arab Emirates ("UAE")
(ironically a staunch ally of the U.S.) is caught up in post-"9/11"
security concerns (even though President Bush supported the
acquisition), and CNOOC because of a hard-core anti-China lobby in
96 See supra notes 1-16 and accompanying text.
97 See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
9' See infra note 154 (discussing The Committee on Foreign Investment in
the United States ("CFIUS")).
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the U.S. and supporters in the U.S. Congress.99 Thus, the underlying
currents of protectionism and Sinophobia evidenced by the uproar
over these proposed SOE investments have direct implications for
possible SWF investments-as such investments could likely
become entangled in the same currents.
Equally so, the concerns expressed by Western Europe about
the Russian Fund seem to get largely mixed up with the geo-political
tension between Western Europe and Russia, as well as with specific
concerns over the expansion of Gazprom, a Russian energy con-
glomerate, into Western Europe.00 One high-level European Union
("EU") official characterized the EU ambivalence toward SWFs in
2007, stating: "I believe there are issues relating to transparency and
governance that we need to engage with certain Sovereign Wealth
Funds on."'' Also, two other Western European commentators
observed:
The reason for European (and American) unease is
concern about the underlying motivation of some of
these new investors. Few SWFs publish their
management structures or investment objectives. Nor
do Russia, Saudi Arabia or China share western
conceptions of capitalism and pluralist democracy.
So these countries might be tempted to buy firms in
certain sectors for reasons other than boosting
investment returns. Russia's use of Gazprom as a
99 See EDWARD M. GRAHAM & DAVID M. MARCHICK, INST. FOR INT'L
ECON., U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 128-
41(2006).
100 See, e.g., Sylvia Pfeifer, Gazprom Flexes Its Muscles in Europe,
TELEGRAPH, Apr. 15, 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/migration
temp/2807346/Gazprom-flexes-its-muscles-in-Europe.html.
101 Charlie McCreevy, Eur. Union, Comm'r for Internal Mkts. & Servs.,
Financial Market Controversies of 2007 and Outlook for 2008, Address
Before the 2007 Institute for Chartered Accountants in England and Wales
(ICAEW) Corporate Finance Faculty December Debate (Dec. 5, 2007),
http://europa.eu/rapid/searchAction.do (under "Date Range" click on the
radio button adjacent to "Search complete database (no date specified)";
then, under "Option Search Criteria," type "SPEECH/07/794" into the text
box adjacent to "Reference"; then click the "Search" button at the bottom of
the page; from the resulting page, one can access the html, pdf, or doc
transcriptions of the speech), at 5.
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foreign policy tool has done nothing to assuage these
102
concerns.
In effect, this is the contentious environment that SWFs and
then Secretary of the Treasury Paulson found themselves in during
2007-2008 when the GFC was unfolding. Even during this period,
Lawrence Summers, a former Secretary of the Treasury and current
Obama senior economic advisor, was speaking out about major,
ominous concerns regarding the role of SWFs within the global
financial system,10 3 and the French President Sarkozy was referring
to non-European SWFs as "predators."' 04 All this was bubbling to the
surface at a time when it was becoming apparent that the global
financial system would soon need significant capital injections. In
fact, the irony of the matter is that a variety of Western financial
institutions (e.g., private equity funds such as Blackstone Group,
Carlyle Group, JC Flowers and Apollo Management); investment
banking firms such as Merrill Lynch, Bear Stearns and Morgan
Stanley; and global banks such as Barclays, CitiGroup and UBS were
actively courting investments from a variety of Middle East and
Asian SWFs.1°5 As part of these interconnections among differing
financial institutions, both private and public, a new pattern of
"global network finance" was emerging. 106
102 Philip Whyte & Katinka Barysch, What Should Europe Do About
Sovereign Wealth Funds?, CER BULL. (Centre For Eur. Reform, London,
Eng.), Oct./Nov. 2007, at 1, 2.
103 See Posting of Lawrence Summers to the Financial Times Economists'
Forum, Sovereign Funds Shake the Logic of Capitalism, http://blogs.
ft.com/economistsforum/2007/07/sovereign-funds.html/ (July 30, 2007,
09:04 GMT).
104 Sarkozy Outlines 'Refoundation' of Capitalism, EURACTIV, Oct. 22,
2008, http://www.euractiv.com/en/financial-services/sarkozy-outlines-
refoundation-capitalism/article- 176571 (last visited Dec. 27, 2009).
105 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein & Amanda M. Rose, The Regulation of
Sovereign Wealth Funds: The Virtues of Going Slow, 76 U. CHI. L. REV.
111, 132 (2009).
106 See Katharina Pistor, Global Network Finance: Institutional Innovation
in the Global Financial Market Place, 37 J. COMP. ECON. 552, 552 (2009)
This notion of "global network finance" will be considered infra in Part V.
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B. Treasury: The Navigator
As mentioned above in Part II.B of this article, the first
public comments about SWFs by the U.S. Treasury came in a con-
ference presentation by Mr. Clay Lowery, then Acting Under
Secretary for International Affairs at the Treasury.' In this context,
Lowery publicly discussed, for the first time, a proposal for
developing "best practices" for SWFs that would involve some form
of 'joint task force" through the IMF and World Bank.108 In doing
so, Lowery was well aware of the possible protectionist backlash
SWFs might create in the U.S. Congress, 109 particularly at a time
when the U.S. Congress was reconsidering the CFIUS regulations. 10
Mr. Lowery, in his June 2007 speech, indicated that the U.S.
Treasury was taking a careful look at SWFs in order to develop a
broader, more informed position on SWFs and their possible impact
on the international and U.S. financial systems.' In so doing, he
provided a glimpse of the behind-the-scenes efforts of the Treasury
regarding SWFs. For example, he indicated that at an April 2007
meeting of the G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors
the Treasury hosted a "special outreach dinner" with Russia, Saudi
Arabia and the UAE, during which SWFs were discussed.1 2 Further,
he stated that in May 2007, the Treasury, along with the Federal
Reserve and the South African Treasury and Reserve Bank, hosted a
meeting of G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Officials on
"Commodity Cycles and Financial Stability" where SWFs were also
discussed. '33 In addition, Lowery mentioned that Deputy Secretary of
the Treasury Kimmitt in early 2007 "has been traveling in Beijing
and Moscow meeting with government officials and business leaders
to promote open investment policies and to gain clarity on their new
investment laws and to better understand the nature and investment
priorities of their soon to be established sovereign wealth funds."
' 1 4
107 Lowery Speech, supra note 55.
108 Id.
109 Id.
l0 Id.; see also infra note 154 (listing recent legislative reforms pertaining
to the CFIUS).
III Lowery Speech, supra note 55.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. It also appears that in March 2007, the Treasury engaged the
President's Working Group on Financial Markets with respect to SWFs. See
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Taking the speech as a whole, one can readily see where the
U.S. Treasury was heading: to set the stage for developing a multi-
lateral approach at the October 2007 G7 Finance Ministers meeting
that would request/direct the IMF to develop a set of best practices
for SWFs. Though perceiving SWF expansion as "understandable,"
Lowery also cautioned that if SWFs obtain operational control of the
companies in which they invest, it may lead to "additional scrutiny"
by governments and may "fuel financial protectionism."' 5 In a
follow-up question and answer session, Lowery indicated that CIC's
recent investment in Blackstone would most likely raise Con-
gressional eyebrows and that China needed to become more adept in
understanding the political dynamics at play in the U.S." 1
6
Lowery "also recommended greater transparency and more
integration with the international financial system for sovereign
wealth funds."'1 7 "He suggested that they show their transparency so
people won't be fearful of them."' ' 8
Also, the Treasury's Spring 2007 position on SWFs needs to
be read in the context of President Bush's preference for strong
"open market" foreign policy,1' 9 along with his position of
developing stronger and more constructive relationships with China
during his second term. 12 Amplifying President Bush's policy
positions was the fact that then Secretary of the Treasury, Henry
Paulson, was the former head of Goldman Sachs, a prestigious and
successful global investment banking firm, and for many years had
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Prepared Statement by Treasury
Under Secretary David H. McCormick in Advance of G-7 Finance Mini-
sters and Central Bank Governors Meeting (Oct. 8, 2008), http://www.treas.
gov/press/releases/hpI 190.htm.
115 Lowery Speech, supra note 55.
116 See China Likely to See US Friction Over Blackstone Deal US Official,
ABCMONEY.CO.UK, June 22, 2007, http://www.abcmoney.co.uk/news/
22200791835.htm# (last visited at Dec. 31, 2009).
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 See Press Release, President George W. Bush, Open Economies Policy
Statement (May 10, 2007), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.
archives.gov/news/releases/2007/05/20070510-2.html.
120 See, e.g., Posting of Elliot Ng to CNReviews.com, US-China Relations:
George W. Bush's Uncharacteristically Nuanced Approach, http://cn
reviews.com/china/us-china relationsgeorge w bushs uncharacteristical
ly nuanced approach 20080808.html (Aug. 8, 2008) (detailing some of
President Bush's efforts to promote U.S.-China relations).
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been a fervent promoter of stronger ties with China. 12 1 Despite this
strong support from the executive branch, as greater public focus on
China's decision to establish the CIC began to develop in the
Summer of 2007 (though the CIC was, in fact, not established until
September 2007 and did not start investing immediately), it became
clear to any observer that China/the CIC could become a controver-
sial matter in the U.S. Congress. 122 Also, as the Summer and Fall of
2007 developed, the Treasury discovered that a number of major
U.S. global financial institutions were in search of significant
injections of fresh capital and that SWFs were being courted in this
regard. 123
In the January/February 2008 issue of Foreign Affairs,
Robert M. Kimmitt, Deputy Secretary of Treasury, published a
widely-read article entitled "Public Footprints in Private Markets:
Sovereign Wealth Funds and the World Economy. ' '14 Stating that
SWFs had already become "systemically significant" and would be
increasingly so, Kimmitt sets out a number of "legitimate policy
questions" of possible governmental concern, including:12 (1)
Whether SWFs "perpetuate[] undesirable underlying macroeconomic
and financial policies.' 2 6 Here, Kimmitt expresses a concern that
noncommodity funds not become a vehicle for accumulating foreign
assets so as to avoid currency appreciation-an indirect reference to
the Chinese situation. (2) The potential impact of SWFs on financial
stability. 127 Although Kimmitt seems "reassured" on this point due to
the nature of SWFs, he does state that a lack of Fund transparency
could lead to market rumors that might cause the private sector to
react. (3) The "most critical set of issues" concerns SWF investments
121 See Henry M. Paulson, Jr., A Strategic Economic Engagement: Streng-
thening U.S.-Chinese Ties, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 2008, at 59 passim;
HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., ON THE BRINK: THE RACE TO STOP THE
COLLAPSE OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 32-33, 52-55 (2010).
122 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
123 See Citigroup Abu Dhabi Deal Signals Trouble Ahead, REUTERS, Nov.
27, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN2752968520071127; Press
Release, Merrill Lynch, Merrill Lynch Enhances Its Capital Position by
Raising Up to $6.2 Billion From Investors, Temasek Holdings and Davis
Selected Advisors (Dec. 24, 2007), http://www.ml.com/index.asp?id 7695_
7696 8149 74412 86378 87784.
124 Kimmitt, Public Footprints, supra note 78.
125 See id. at 119, 122-23.
126 Id. at 122.
127 Id. at 122-23.
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that involve taking active control of private firms-the major
concern here being that of national security interests.
12
8
Kimmitt also highlighted the need of recipient countries of
SWF investments to "do no harm"-i.e., to "maintain their
unequivocal support for international investment" and not to fall into
a pattern of protectionism.129 Furthermore, Kimmitt does not favor a
policy of mandated "reciprocity"-i.e., "reciprocal openness to
investment"-between the SWF sponsoring country and the SWF
recipient country. 130 By the time Kimmitt's article was published, the
G7 meeting of Finance Ministers had already met in October 2007
and had charted out the roles for the IMF and the OECD. 3 ' The
"game plan," as orchestrated by Secretary Paulson and the Treasury,
was effectively in place.
On March 5, 2008, David H. McCormick, the new Under
Secretary for International Affairs and the former Deputy National
Security Advisor to the President for International Economic Affairs,
testified about SWFs before joint subcommittees of the House of
Representatives. 132 He had previously testified along similar lines,
before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs on November 14, 2007.' In his March 2008 testimony,
McCormick set out numerous benefits of SWFs, stressed that the
U.S. "remains committed to open investment" and delineated the
numerous benefits foreign investment has brought to the U.S.
economy, including tying foreign investors' economic interests more
closely to those of the U.S.1 34 McCormick specifically pointed out
that SWFs have an "interest in and a responsibility for financial
market stability."' 135 He set out a series of policy steps that the
128 Id. at 123.
129 Id. at 124.
130 Id. at 128.
131 See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
132 Foreign Government Investment in the U.S. Economy and Financial
Sector Before Subcomm. on Domestice and International Monetary Policy,
Trade and Technology and Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and
Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Financial Services
110th Cong. (2008) [hereinafter McCormick (2008)] (statement of David H.
McCormick, Under Secretary for International Affairs, U.S. Department of
the Treasury), available at http://fmancialservices.house.gov/hearing 10/
mccormick0305O8.pdf.
133 McCormick (2007), supra note 25.
134 McCormick (2008), supra note 132.
135 Id.
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Treasury was pursuing to "ensure that the United States can continue
to benefit from open investment while addressing . . .potential
concerns [about SWFs].' 3 6 In his concluding remarks, McCormick
assured the subcommittees that the "Treasury Department will
continue its work on sovereign wealth funds through sound analysis
and focused bilateral and multilateral efforts to help ensure the
United States shapes an appropriate international response to this
issue, addresses legitimate areas of concern, and together with other
countries, remains open to foreign investment. ' '13 These assurances
of ongoing Treasury vigilance were obviously intended to head-off
any adverse Congressional actions against SWFs.
Of further major significance, on March 20, 2008, Secretary
of the Treasury Paulson, the heads of the Abu Dhabi SWF and one of
the two Singapore SWFs (GIC), along with the Abu Dhabi and
Singapore governments, agreed that all their SWF investments would
be based solely on commercial grounds and that these funds would
work toward increasing the disclosure of information and making
sure they have strong risk management and governance controls.
They also agreed that countries that receive investment should not set
up protectionist barriers and should have consistent, non-discrimina-
tory investment rules.1 38 The announcement of these nine "Policy
Principles" caught many by surprise, as Treasury and the G7 had set
into play the IMF- OECD agenda to arrive at "best practices. 139 One
could only surmise that this was Paulson's posturing to put pressure
on and to provide specific direction to the IMF-OECD efforts. As
such, these agreed upon "Principles" would be the benchmark to
consider for other SWFs, the IMF and OECD in arriving at their sets
of "best practices." A subsequent Treasury Release indicated the




138 See Gov't of the Republic of Sing., Joint Release of Policy Principles for
Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Countries Receiving Sovereign Wealth
Fund Investment by the United States, Abu Dhabi and Singapore, at app. A
(Mar. 21, 2008) (available at http://www.channelnewsasia.com/annex/
210308swf.pdf); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Treasury
Reaches Agreement on Principles for Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment
with Singapore and Abu Dhabi (Mar. 20, 2008) (available at http://www.
ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp881.htm) [hereinafter Singapore Principles].
139 See infra Part IV.
140 See Singapore Principles, supra note 138.
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C. The Bank and Securities Market Regulators:
The Federal Reserve and the SEC
As mentioned above, as early as Spring 2008,141 the Treasury
had been consulting with the other members of the President's
Working Group on Financial Markets ("PWGFM") with respect to
SWFs.' In the U.S., responsibility for vetting foreign bank
operations rests with the Federal Reserve Board ("FRB") under the
1978 and 1991 international banking legislation and related FRB
regulations. In effect, for most purposes-including for the purposes
of the Bank Holding Company Act ("BHCA") and the Change in
Bank Control Act ("CIBCA")-foreign banking institutions are
under the same regulation as their domestic counterparts. 143 In this
context, it is significant that most of the recent SWF investments in
U.S. financial institutions were structured to consist of non-
controlling interests below 10% of voting equity stock. 4 4 In effect,
these investments were structured as passive investments, thus not
triggering the 25% control threshold under the BHCA and the 10%
threshold under the CIBCA. If either of these thresholds were
141 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Prepared Statement by
Treasury Under Secretary David H. McCormick, supra note 114 (discussing
achievements by the International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth
Funds).
142 The PWGFM was set up by Presidential Executive Order 12631 and
signed into law by President Reagan on March 18, 1988 as a reaction to the
"Black Monday" stock market crash of October 19, 1987. This group is
comprised of the Treasury Secretary, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve
Board of Governors, the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, the Chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, or their
respective designees. See Exec. Order No. 12,631, 53 Fed. Reg. 9421 (Mar.
18, 1988), 1988 WL 311195.
143 See, e.g., Federal Reserve Bank of New York, FedPoint: Foreign Banks
and the Federal Reserve (April 2007), http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthe
fed/fedpoint/fed26.html (last visited Dec. 31, 2009).
144 See Anna L. Paulson, Fed. Reserve Bank of Chicago, Raising Capital:
The Role of Sovereign Wealth Funds, Jan. 2009, at 2-3, http://www.
chicagofed.org/digital assets/publications/chicagofed letter/2009/cfljanuar
y2009 258.pdf (citing WILLIAM MIRACKY, ET AL., MONITOR GROUP,
ASSESSING THE RISKS: BEHAVIORS OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY (2008)).
145 Joel Slawotsky, Sovereign Wealth Funds as Emerging Financial Super-
powers: How U.S. Regulators Should Respond, THE FREE LIBRARY, http://
Vol. 29
2009-2010 "SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES" & SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 495
triggered by an SWF, it would be subject to a comprehensive review
by the Federal Reserve. Furthermore, if an SWF came in control of
or acquired a controlling interest in a U.S. banking institution, it
would become subject to extensive U.S. bank regulation, including
anti-money laundering, counter-terrorism and affiliate transactions
regulations. 146 In a recent Congressional hearing, Scott G. Alvarez,
the Federal Reserve General Counsel, provided testimony reassuring
Congress that current federal banking laws and regulations were
adequate to deal with SWFs in terms of bank regulatory and
supervisory concern.141
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") is
the governmental authority responsible for the oversight of the U.S.
securities markets and the enforcement of federal securities laws. The
bywords for the SEC are "material disclosure/transparency" and
"effective enforcement., 14' The SEC had been relatively low-key
with respect to addressing the SWF subject-matter. However, in 2007
and early 2008, then SEC Chairman Christopher Cox had given
several public speeches in which he touched upon the subject of
SWFs. 149 Noting the increasing convergence of capital markets
around the world, the rise of borderless trading and the combination
and linking of stock exchanges, Chairman Cox led into his discussion
of SWFs by commenting that "we are now dealing with the growing
www.thefreelibrary.com/Sovereign+Wealth+Funds+as+emerging+financial
+superpowers: +how+U.S....-a0215514218 (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
146 See, e.g., Eric Dash & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Citigroup Sells Abu Dhabi
Fund $7.5 Billion Stake, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2007, http://www.
nytimes.com/2007/11/27/business/27citi.html (stating that the transaction
"has been approved by federal regulators," and that Citigroup executives
"[do] not expect the deal to be derailed on regulatory... grounds.").
147 See Sovereign Wealth Funds: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking,
Housing & Urban Affairs, 10th Cong. (2008) (statement of Scott G.
Alvarez, Gen. Counsel, Fed. Reserve Bd.), available at http://www.f
ederalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/alvarez2008O424a.htm.
148 See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC
Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital
Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Apr. 10,
2010).
149 See, e.g., Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n,
Gauer Distinguished Lecture in Law and Policy at the American Enterprise
Institute Legal Center for Public Interest: The Rise of Sovereign Business
(Dec. 5, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
2007/spchl2O5O7cc.htm).
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phenomenon of the state-owned, but publicly traded, company."
' 50
The issues concerning Cox and the SEC included enforcement and
effectiveness of cross-border governmental collaboration, conflicts of
interest when the government is both the regulator and the regulated,
opportunities for political corruption, market efficiency, transparen-
cy, corporate governance, investor protection and investor confi-
dence and the impact upon the U.S. markets and the U.S. economy.
Despite these concerns, Cox displayed a sense of calm by not trying
to come up with quick answers to these and other questions
concerning the SWFs. Rather, he encouraged the broad, collaborative
analysis that was going on within the U.S. Government, the G7 and
among other governments and the International Financial Institutions
("IFIs"). 151
In her testimony before the Congressional U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, Linda Thomsen,
Director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement, stated that many of
the enforcement concerns regarding SWFs were similar to the SEC's
concerns with hedge funds, though she added that the SWF concern
was more severe due to the linkage of the SWFs to government
ownership. 152 She also expressed concerns that the overseas
cooperative policing efforts through the SEC's network of
Memorandums of Understanding ("MOUs") might be impaired in
certain enforcement situations involving SWFs.1
53
D. The CFIUS and National Security: The
Executive-Congressional Linkage
As was evident in the Spring of 2007, the Treasury was well
aware of potential problems with the CFIUS 154 concerning the rise of
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 See Testimony Concerning Sovereign Wealth Funds and Public
Disclosure: Hearing Before the U.S.-China Econ. & Sec. Review Comm 'n,
110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Linda Chatman Thomsen, Dir., Div. of
Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n), available at http://www.sec.
gov/news/testimony/2008/ts02O7O8lct.htm.
153 id.
154 The Treasury provides a description of the CFIUS:
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States (CFIUS) is an inter-agency committee authorized to
review transactions that could result in control of a U.S.
business by a foreign person ("covered transactions"), in
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SWFs and regarding China's CIC in particular. 155 The July 2007,
Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 ("FINSA")
legislation re-established the CFIUS under statute and pursuant to
statutory procedures. The Act also added seven additional criteria to
the original five criteria for the Committee to consider in its review
processes, including national security considerations. 156 In November
2008, the Treasury enacted the final CFIUS regulations. 157 In effect,
CFIUS and FINSA provide a nexus between the Executive and
Congress in their historic tension over international economic affairs.
order to determine the effect of such transactions on the
national security of the United States. CFIUS operates
pursuant to section 721 of the Defense Production Act of
1950, as amended by the Foreign Investment and National
Security Act of 2007 (F1NSA) (section 721) and as
implemented by Executive Order 11858, as amended, and
regulations at 31 C.F.R. Part 800. The CFIUS process has
been the subject of significant reforms over the past
several years. These include numerous improvements in
internal CFIUS procedures, enactment of F1NSA in July
2007, amendment of Executive Order 11858 in January
2008, revision of the CF1US regulations in November
2008, and publication of guidance on CFIUS's national
security considerations in December 2008.
U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, OFFICE OF INV. SEC., The Comm. on Foreign Inv.
in the U.S. (CFIUS), http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/international-affairs/
cfius/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2009). For a summary of the final November
2008 CFIUS Regulations, see U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, CFIUS REFORM:
FINAL REGULATIONS ISSUED ON NOVEMBER 14, 2008 (Nov. 14, 2008),
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/international-affairs/cfius/docs/Summary-
FinalRegs.pdf. For a copy of the CFIUS Guidance, see Office of Investment
Security; Guidance Concerning the National Security Review Conducted by
the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, 73 Fed. Reg.
74567-02 (Dec. 8, 2008), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/
international-affairs/cfius/docs/CFIUSGuidance.pdf. For a copy of the
FINSA statute, see Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007,
50 App. U.S.C.A. § 2170 (2007) (Westlaw).
155 See Lowery Speech, supra note 55.
156 JAMES K. JACKSON, SPECIALIST IN INT'L TRADE & FIN., COMM. ON
FOREIGN INV. IN THE U.S., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT
FOR CONGRESS 13 (2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/
RL33388.pdf
157 For discussion of the history and objectives of the CFIUS, see id. at 1-2.
The CFIUS is now required to consider the twelve statutory criteria. Id. at
11-13.
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The CFIUS, as revamped by FINSA, is intended to help diffuse this
tension in the area of foreign investments and acquisitions in the U.S.
and the post-9/1 1 national security debate. In an effort to fend off the
rise of Congressional protectionism, the Treasury and the President
had to posture themselves as being tough under the CFIUS, while
still endeavoring to preserve the fundamental policy goal of open
markets and investments. It is on this political tightrope that
Secretary Paulson and the Treasury had to tread during the 2007-
2008 period, when the debate over SWFs was percolating.
E. CRS, Congress and the U.S.-China
Commission
The U.S. Congress'5 8 receives its information from a variety
of sources, two of which are reports of the Congressional Research
Service ("CRS") and Congressional Hearings. 5 9 Both of these
sources can influence the legislative process and results on specific
subject-matter.
The CRS has to date presented three reports to Congress in
connection with the SWF subject-matter: "The Committee on
Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)" (Feb. 4, 2010);6 °
"China's Sovereign Wealth Fund" (Jan. 22, 2008);161 and "Sovereign
Wealth Funds: Background and Policy Issues for Congress" (Jan. 28,
2008, revised Jan. 15, 2009). 112 As discussed above, the CRS CFIUS
Report was prepared for Congressional hearings on the overall
national security implications of FDI in the U.S. These FDI national
security implications became problematic again as a result of the
151 See, e.g., JOHN V. SULLIVAN, How OUR LAWS ARE MADE, H.R. Doc.
No. 110-49 (2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname- 110 cong documents&docid-f:hd049.1 1O.pdf.
159 The CRS is a century-old legislative branch agency within the Library of
Congress that works exclusively for the United States Congress, providing
policy and legal analysis to committees and members of both the House and
Senate, regardless of party affiliation a type of independent Congressional
"think-tank." See OpenCRS, http://opencrs.com/ (last visited Dec. 3 1,
2009).
160 See JACKSON, supra note 154.
161 See MARTIN, supra note 1.
162 See MARTIN A. WEISS, ANALYST IN INT'L TRADE & FIN., CONGRES-
SIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: BACKGROUND
AND POLICY ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (9009), available at http://assets.
opencrs.com/rpts/RL34336 20090115.pdf.
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2005 DP World's bid to take over P&O's commercial operations of
U.S. ports as a lead-up to international economic affairs, and, to a
lesser extent, the growing general sense of protectionism within the
Congress and the American populace. 163 Neither this Report nor the
related FINSA legislation directly considered SWFs, but the Report
commented in objective and balanced terms as to state-owned/
controlled FDIs in the U.S.'64
The CRS's China SWF Report provided Congress with
current, relevant background information on the advent of the CIC,
its structure, management, capitalization, investment strategy,
operations and general implications for the Chinese economy. 165 This
Report highlighted a series of potential risks to the U.S. economy and
raised generally the issue of "reciprocity.' 6 6 Balancing these
concerns, the China Report observed: "However, some commenta-
tors are concerned that increasing the regulatory review of SWFs will
precipitate a period of financial protectionism. The issue is whether
the value of protection obtained outweighs the foregone benefits of
investments prevented in a more restrictive global financial
market." 
167
Of the Congressional Hearings that have been held con-
cerning SWFs and FDI issues, the following two hearings are
relevant here: (1) the November 2007 Hearing of the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs on SWFs and the
economic and national security implications raised by the state-
owned investment funds that invest in U.S. companies, 168 and (2) the
February 2008 Hearings of the Joint (Senate and House) Economic
Committee to consider the increased investments in the U.S. by
foreign SWFs.169 Both hearings contained mostly balanced and
insightful testimony respecting SWFs, while raising a range of
concerns.
163 See supra note 154.
164 See JACKSON, supra note 154.
165 See MARTIN, supra note 1.
166 MARTIN, supra note 1, at 13-14.
1
67 Id. at 19.
168 Sovereign Wealth Fund Acquisitions and Other Foreign Government
Investments in the U.S.: Assessing the Economic and National Security
Implications: Hearing Before the U.S. S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. &
Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2007).
169 See Do Sovereign Wealth Funds Make the U.S. Economy Stronger or
Pose National Security Risks?: Hearing Before U.S. S. J. Econ. Comm.,
110th Cong. (2008).
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The November 2007 Senate Banking Committee Hearing
was chaired by Senator Evan Bayh. 170 Those testifying included Mr.
David H. McCormick, Under Secretary for International Affairs,
Department of the Treasury (discussed above); Mr. Alan P. Larson,
Senior International Policy Advisor, Covington & Burling LLP; Dr.
Edwin M. Truman, Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International
Economics; Mr. Patrick A. Mulloy, Washington Representative,
Alfred P. Sloan Foundation; and Dr. Gerard Lyons, Chief Economist
and Group Head of Global Research, Standard Chartered Bank.'
Mr. Truman set forth, for future discussion purposes, a possible
"scorecard" for evaluating the transparency levels of the main SWFs;
Under Secretary McCormick presented the Treasury's supportive
approach; while Mr. Lyons elaborated upon what he perceived as a
new aspect of the global financial system-"State Capitalism.""17
In opening the U.S. Congress Joint Economic Committee
Hearings in February 2008, Senator Schumer expressed some strong
general concerns, though he concluded: "My hope is that sovereign
wealth funds can assure us that they will behave like other economic
actors, and if they do so that's all to the good. 173 Those testifying
were the current Treasury Under Secretary, David McCormick, the
former Deputy Secretary of the Treasury under President Clinton;
former Ambassador to the European Union, Stuart Eizenstat; and
prominent foreign investment expert, Douglas Rediker 1 74 Each
presented balanced and supportive perspectives on SWFs.
17 5
Thus, we see Congressional concerns being expressed, but
on balance, it appears that Congress is willing to work with the
Treasury and the IFIs in setting out appropriate "rules of the road"
for the SWFs. Yet, continuing to percolate under the surface were
rising protectionist and Sinophobe concerns on the part of some
segments of the Congress. Evidence of these concerns/fears arose
from some testimony at the February 7, 2008 Hearing of the U.S.-
China Economic and Security Review Commission ("USCESRC")
176
170 Sovereign Wealth Fund Acquisitions, supra note 166.
171 Id.
172 id.
173 Do Sovereign Wealth Funds Make the U.S. Economy Stronger, supra
note 167, at 4 (statement of Sen. Charles E. Schumer).
174 Id. at II,.
175 See generally id.
176 J. Dennis Hastert provides a description of the USCESRC:
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on "Implications of Sovereign Wealth Fund Investments for National
Security. 17 7 Most (but not all) of the presenters expressed a balance
between benefits and concerns, and the overriding concerns of most
were the need for greater transparency and accountability. The
problem with considering SWFs, when the focus is on the CIC, is
that discussions tend to disintegrate into broader political concerns
about China (e.g., its autocratic nature, economic and currency
reserve policies, human rights, etc.).
178
F. The U.S Polity: The Great Variable
Adding to the complexities of the Treasury's and Secretary
Paulson's efforts to provide a "safe passage" for the SWFs was the
presidential election campaign that was underway during the 2007-
2008 period. In particular, the two main Democratic Party candidates
scrambled to deal with rising issues of a failing domestic economy,
protectionism (anti-North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA"), anti-globalization, anti-outsourcing, etc.), immigration
and national security concerns-most of which seemed to get
intertwined. Falling within this web, at least momentarily, was the
SWF issue. 179 But, as the election concluded and President Obama
In October 2000, Congress established the U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission
(USCESRC). The commission is a small advisory body,
one of few such commissions that report to Congress
rather than the President or an executive branch agency.
The charter of the commission, which does not contain a
time limit on its authorization, requires it to assess the
national security implications of the evolving bilateral
trade and economic relationship between the United States
and the People's Republic of China.
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND
SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION: ACTIONS NEEDED TO IMPROVE CONTROLS
OVER KEY MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS 1 (2007), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071128.pdf.
177 See generally Implications of Sovereign Wealth Fund Investments for
National Security: Hearing Before the U.S.-China Econ. & Sec. Review
Comm 'n, 110th Cong. (2008).
171 See id.
179 See, e.g., Laura Badian & Gregory Harrington, The Evolving Politics of
Sovereign Wealth Funds, REVUE D'ECONOMIE FINANCIERE 143, 152
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was sworn into office, the brouhaha about SWFs settled down and
hardly a further controversial political mention of SWFs has been
heard. 80
IV. The International Policy Network Track
By November 2007, in addition to the constructive
engagement of the Executive Branch, the U.S. Congress, and the
relevant U.S. regulators, Secretary Paulson and the U.S. Treasury
were spearheading efforts to engage proactively with the
international community through the G7, the IMF and its IMFC,
OECD, World Bank, and the main SWFs and recipient countries.181
The purpose of this international collaboration was to respond to
various legitimate concerns about SWFs by arriving at a coordinated
and balanced approach through setting best practice standards: a set
of "best practices" ("IMF-IWG" derived) (particularly as to
transparency, accountability and governance concerns) for the SWFs
that would benefit the financial markets, and a set of "best practices"
(OECD-derived) as to investment-related issues in order to fend off
growing populist trends against globalization and free markets. It
appears that the March 2008 Treasury-Singapore-Abu Dhabi
Agreement, discussed above,1 82 was the benchmark in such
multilateral efforts.
A. The IMF and OECD's Respective
Roles
The IMF and World Bank's 2007 joint Annual Meeting was
183scheduled for October 20-22, 2007. Immediately prior to such
(2009), available at http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/
Arnold&PorterLLP EvolvingPoliticsSoverignWealthFunds 2009.pdf.
180 But consider Lawrence Summer's comments: Posting of Lawrence
Summers to the Financial Times Economists' Forum, supra note 104, and
reported tough statements of President Obama's nominee for Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs on SWFs. See SWF
Institute, President Obama Nominee Supports Scrutiny Of Sovereign Wealth
Funds, Nov. 5, 2009, http://www.swfinstitute.org/.
181 See supra Part 111.
182 See Singapore Principles, supra note 138.
183 See 2007 Annual Meetings: World Bank Group International Monetary
Fund, http://www.imf.org/external/am/2007/index.htm (last visited Jan. 7,
2010).
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annual meeting, the G7 Finance Ministers would normally meet
among themselves and then with the IMFC. At this particular annual
"network gathering," Mr. Paulson and the U.S. Treasury had
arranged for the issue of the SWFs and the perceived roles of the IFIs
to be put on the G7's agenda for its October 19, 2007 meeting.
18 4
After this meeting, Mr. Paulson, as an "initial step," hosted an
"outreach dinner" with finance ministers and heads of SWFs from
eight countries: China, Kuwait, Norway, Russia, Saudi Arabia,
Singapore, South Korea, and the United Arab Emirates."1"5 While
indicating that countries should be open to SWF investments,
Paulson commented further that it was important these countries did
not use these funds for political objectives.18 6 He also suggested that
"many want countries that have these SWFs to open their own
markets to investment before they are allowed to make massive
investments overseas."'18 7 Paulson viewed the dinner as a "first step
toward a possible agreement on best practices for SWFs."'1
Secretary Paulson then addressed the IMFC the following morning to
persuade the Committee to endorse the "best practices" approach.18 9
As such, Paulson (in his capacity as Secretary of the Treasury) was
"nudging" the IMF, along with the OECD (from the FDI perspective)
and the World Bank, to take on the task of overseeing the
development of the SWF "best practices" project. The IMFC
promptly got on board with Paulson's SWF agenda, acknowledging
the IMF's new role with respect to SWFs. 190
184 See Jenilee Guebert, Senior Researcher, G8 Research Group, G7
Finamce [sic] Ministers Prospects, http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/finance/fin/
2008fm.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2010).
185 See Pete Kasperowicz, Paulson Sets Tough Goals for IMF on Sovereign
Wealth Funds, Currency, Spending, FORBES.COM, Oct. 20, 2007, http://
www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/2007/10/20/afx4242119.html; see also Kimmitt,
In Praise of Foreign Investment, supra note 78, at 71.
186 See Kasperowicz, supra note 185; see also Kimmitt, In Praise of Foreign
Investment, supra note 78, at 71.
187 See Kasperowicz, supra note 185; see also Kimmitt, In Praise of Foreign
Investment, supra note 78, at 71.
188 Kasperowicz, supra note 185.
189 See Press Release, U.S. Treasury Dep't Office of Pub. Affairs, Statement
by U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr., at the International
Monetary and Financial Committee Meeting (Oct. 20, 2007) (available at
http://www.imf.org/External/AM/2007/imfc/statement/eng/usa.pdf).
190 See Press Release, Int'l Monetary Fund, Communiqu6 of the Inter-
national Monetary and Financial Committee of the Board of Governors of
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If one were to look back at the 2005-2007 timeframe, there
was substantial doubt in the international community about the future
viability of the IMF.191 In addition, the IMF had come to be viewed
more as a pawn of the United States and the major Western powers,
having little institutional legitimacy. 92 While Paulson's delegation of
a new task to the IMF is indicative of this latter point, the IMF
nevertheless welcomed this new task.1
93
After the October 2007 G7 Finance Ministers' and IMFC's
direction, the IMF promptly convened a "roundtable of sovereign asset
and reserve managers" from twenty eight countries on November 15-
16,2007.194 The IIVIF also embarked upon a comprehensive survey of
the main SWFs, began formulating a work plan ("Work Agenda") for
the International Monetary Fund 6 (Oct. 20, 2007) (available at
https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2007 /prO7236.htm).
191 See generally REFORMING THE GOVERNANCE OF THE IMF AND THE
WORLD BANK (Ariel Buira, ed., 2005); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALI-
ZATIONS AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002); G24 RESEARCH PROGRAM,
REFORMING THE GOVERNANCE OF THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK (Ariel
Buira ed., Anthem Press 2000); NGAIRE WOODS, THE GLOBALIZERS: THE
IMF, THE WORLD BANK, AND THEIR BORROWERS (2006).
192 See, e.g., Chakravarthi Raghavan, Stinging Critiques of IMF, US
Treasury, THIRD WORLD NETWORK, Apr. 12, 2000. http://www.twnside.
org.sg/title/sting.htm.
193 This SWF assignment seems to be compatible with the IMF's initiation
of its multilateral consultation on global imbalances, and fits more generally
within the IMF's perceived mandate to foster global financial stability and
economic growth, to encourage greater transparency and accountability
within the global economic order and to oversee the global currency
exchange rate fluctuations and adjustments. This task also seems to be
consistent with the IMF's "operational" instruments: enhanced surveillance,
proactive engagement with its members through consultations and technical
assistance if needed and requested. With the GFC, the IMF also found new
client countries and new roles (or enhanced prior roles, such as surveillance
and country consultations) in the proposed Bretton Woods II international
financial architecture being put forth by the G20 Leaders and Finance
Ministers. Cf Edwin M. Truman, Senior Fellow, Peterson Inst. for Int'l
Econ., Remarks delivered to the Tulsa Committee on Foreign Relations and
to the Dallas Committee on Foreign Relations: The IMF and the Global
Crisis: Role and Reform 1 (Jan. 22-23, 2009) (transcript available at
http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/trumanO I 09.pdf).
194 David R. Francis, Will Sovereign Wealth Funds Rule the World?, THE
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Nov. 26, 2007, http://www.csmonitor.
com/2007/1126/p I6sO I-wmgn.htm 1.
Vol. 29
2009-2010 "SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES" & SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 505
developing best practice guidelines for SWFs, and undertook broader
related international collaborative efforts so as to better evaluate the
possible beneficial and negative implications of the growing presence
of SWFs within the international financial system. Issues that were to
be considered included the relation of SWFs (1) to financial stability
and currency exchange rate impact, (2) to possible geo-political issues,
such as the likelihood of government policy direction of these funds
and a rise of protectionism among home or target countries, and (3) to
risk management issues, including matters of transparency,
accountability and governance. 195
On February 29, 2008, the IMF set forth a "Work Agenda"
as to its SWF assignment. 196 Under this Agenda, the IMF would
establish a Working Group, with a SWF proposal to be presented to
the IMF's Executive Board at its Fall 2008 Annual Meeting and to
take the form of "principles" and suggested "best practices." The
final proposal was to be based upon consultations with various
officials of the SWF host countries (the first having occurred on
April 30-May 1, 2008), their Central Banks and Finance Ministry
officials and with relevant public and private parties in the
investment recipient countries. The final proposal would be issued
after review of the results of a detailed survey sent to these SWFs as
to their composition, objectives, management and operations, and
after consultations with other bodies-such as the OECD, the EU
Commission and ECB, the U.S. Treasury-and other concerned
finance ministries. 197 As surmised by Jaime Caruana (then Director
of the IMF's Monetary and Capital Markets Department, former head
of the Spanish Central Bank and now General Manager of the Bank
for International Settlements): "Best practices and principles could
also help ease concerns about SWFs in recipient countries and
contribute to an open global monetary and financial system .... [I]n
our [the IMF's] view, the key to a successful result is one that is
based on an inclusive, collaborative, and evenhanded effort."'19
The G7 and IMFC tasked the OECD with developing a
related and complementary voluntary SWF investment "code" for the
recipient countries, so that free flows of global capital and foreign
195 See WORK AGENDA, supra note 4, at 10-16.
196 id.
197 Id at 21-22.
19' See IMF Survey online, IMF Board Endorses Work Agenda on
Sovereign Funds, INT'L MONETARY FUND, Mar. 21, 2008, https://www.
imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/survey/so/2008/N EW032108A.htm.
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investment are not impaired by undue reactions of the recipient or
targeted investment countries. 199 The OECD appeared to take a rather
relaxed attitude, concluding that an array of existing OECD guide-
lines and codes should adequately address the question of appropriate
host country treatment of SWF investments.20 0 Angel Gurria,
Secretary General of the OECD, commented that the OECD "had not
come across an example of a sovereign wealth fund acting for any
reason other than the pursuit of profit., 20'1 Gurria went on to com-
ment that investments by SWFs should not be subject to restrictions
so long as they meet certain criteria: they are motivated by the pur-
suit of profit and business, they are professionally led and managed
and they regularly divulge results and information in keeping with
other financial institutions z. z
B. A Most Recent Hybrid Bretton Woods-I
Network Process: The International Working
Group (IWG)-International Sovereign Wealth
Fund Forum (ISWF Forum) and the Santiago
Principles (GAAP)
1. The IMF/IWG, OECD and World
Bank
Being in the navigator's seat by March 2008,23 the IMF
moved forward with its formal "Work Agenda." An IWG of SWFs
199 See Statement, G-7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, G7/8
Finance Ministers Meeting (Oct. 19, 2007), http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/f
inance/fm071019.htm.
200 The OECD viewed the SWF assignment as part of its pre-existing
"Freedom of Investment" process. See OECD Guidance on Sovereign Wealth
Funds, Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., http://www.oecd.org/document/
19/0,3343,en 2649 34887 41807059 1 1 1 1,00.html (last visited Apr. 10,
2010).
201 Sovereign Wealth Funds Likely to Boost Stakes in Gulf Markets, DUBAI
CHRONICLES, May 2008, http://www.dubaichronicle.info/2008/05/
sovereign-wealth-fund-likely-to-boost.html.
202 Grim Economy No Reason for Protectionism: OECD Chief, FIN.
ExPREss, Mar. 28, 2008, http://www.financialexpress.com/news/grim-
economy-no-reason-for-protectionism-oecd-chief/289244/.
203 However, Mr. Paulson and the Treasury were still negotiating separately
with Abu Dhabi and Singapore on the Singapore Principles during the
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comprising senior officials from twenty five SWFs was constituted in
May 2008 for the specific purpose of agreeing "on a common set of
voluntary principles for SWFs, drawing on the existing body of
principles and practices, to help maintain the free flow of cross-
border investment and open and stable financial systems. 2 °4
Contemporaneously, considerable background research and study
was being conducted by the IMF, World Bank and OECD, while the
U.S. Treasury continued to engage in bilateral discussions with
selective major SWFs.2 °5 In addition, the European Commission
worked with the concerned EU countries to arrive at a common EU
position.2 06 "The IWG met on three occasions-in Washington, D.C.,
Singapore and Santiago (Chile)-to identify and to draft a set of
generally accepted principles and practices ("GAPP," also known as
the Santiago Principles) that properly reflects their investment
practices and objectives. The IWG agreed on the Santiago Principles
at its third meeting. ,20 The IMF and IWG completed their survey of
SWFs on September 15, 2008.
201
At its September 2, 2008 meeting in Santiago, the IWG
agreed preliminarily to a set of twenty four "principles" ("Generally
Accepted Principles and Practices") covering the SWF's legal,
institutional and macroeconomic setting, the SWF's governance and
November 2007-March 2008 period. See supra note 138 and accompanying
text.
204 See Press Release, Int'l Monetary Fund, International Working Group of
Sovereign Wealth Funds is Established to Facilitate Work on Voluntary
Principles (May 1, 2008) available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/
pr/2008/pr0897.htm; see also supra note 17 (discussing IWG membership).
205 See, e.g., Singapore Principles, supra note 138.
206 See, e.g., COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN CMTYS., COMMUNICATION FROM
THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF
THE REGIONS: A COMMON EUROPEAN APPROACH TO SOVEREIGN WEALTH
FUNDS 3 (2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal market/finances/
docs/sovereign en.pdf.
207 INT'L WORKING GROUP OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, SOVEREIGN
WEALTH FUNDS: GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES
"SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES" 1 (2008), available at http://www.iwg-swf.org/
pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf.
201 See Cornelia Hammer, Peter Kunzel & Iva Petrova, Sovereign Wealth
Funds: Current Institutional and Operational Practices (Int'l Working
Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, Working Paper No. 08/254, 2008)
(available at http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/eng/swfsurvey.pdt).
REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW
accountability arrangements, and the SWF's investment policies and
risk management. 209 The IWG members returned home to recom-
mend the GAPP to their respective governments and, having secured
this approval, the IWG presented the GAPP to the IMFC on October
11, 2008 in Washington, D.C. 210 Immediately following this meeting,
the IWG met with a range of officials from major recipient
countries. 211 The GAPP were published promptly thereafter.
12
At this IMFC meeting, the IWG also announced the creation of a
"Formation Committee" to explore whether a permanent SWF
"Standing Group" should be established.213 The objective of this
Standing Group would be "to facilitate dialogue with official institu-
tions and recipient countries on developments that affect SWF opera-
tions. 2 4 Thus, inherent to the creation of the Santiago Principles-
GAPP was the distinct possibility that there would be established
some ongoing organizational mechanism to further study and
monitor the implementation of these Principles.
2 15
Though overshadowed by the more high profile work of the
IMF regarding the development of SWF best practices, the OECD
was intended to have a key parallel and coordinated role under the
2007 IMFC mandate on SWFs. 2" The OECD's role was to develop
209 Press Release, International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds
Reaches a Preliminary Agreement on Draft Set Generally Accepted Prin-
ciples and Practices "Santiago Principles" (Sept. 2, 2008) (available at
http://www.iwg-swf.org/pr/swfpr0804.htm).
210 See Press Release, International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth
Funds Presents the "Santiago Principles" to the International Monetary and
Financial Committee: Promotes Operational Independence in Investment




213 See H.E. Hamad Al-Hurr AI-Suwaidi, Co-Chair of Int'l Working Group
of Sovereign Wealth Funds, Statement at the Meeting of the Int'l Monetary
and Fin. Comm., (Oct. 11, 2008) available at http://www.iwg-swf.org/
pubs/eng/imfciwg.pdf.
214 See IMF Survey online, SWF Principles Will Help Cross-Border
Investment-Lipsky, INT'L MONETARY FUND, Sept. 3, 2008, https:/
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2008/NEWO90308B.htm.
215 See infra Part V.
216 See supra notes 138, 205 and accompanying text, discussing the
Singapore Principles.
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"best practices" for countries who receive SWF investment, 217 taking
into account possible FDI and security issues. In October 2008, the
OECD presented its final package of "guidance" for countries
receiving SWF investment,218 which was developed pursuant to the
October 2007 G7 Finance Ministers' mandate.2 19 As mentioned
above, the OECD's approach essentially was to subsume the SWF
issue under its "Freedom of Investment and National Security"
220process ("FOI" process). Since 2006, the OECD Investment Com-
221mittee has been responsible for the FOI process. In light of the
current GFC and pressures for a move toward protectionism, this
process has been ramped up to provide "a forum for intergovern-
mental dialogue on how governments can reconcile the need to
preserve and expand an open international investment environment
with their duty to safeguard the essential security interests of their
people and take action to recover from the crisis" with a series of
investment policy reports being issued to date and to be issued
throughout 20 10.222 This enhanced process extended and intensified
the OECD tradition of ongoing "dialogue" beyond its member
217 Kimmitt, Public Footprints, note 78, at 129-30.
218 See Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., Message by the OECD
Secretary-General to the International Monetary and Financial Committee 1
(Oct. 11, 2008) (available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/0/23/41456730.
pdf).
219 The Finance Ministers issued the following stamement:
[W]e agreed that sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are
increasingly important participants in the international
financial system and that our economies can benefit from
openness to SWF investment flows. We see merit in
identifying best practices for SWFs in such areas as
institutional structure, risk management, transparency and
accountability. For recipients of government-controlled
investments, we think it is important to build on principles
such as nondiscrimination, transparency, and predict-
ability.... We ask the IMF, World Bank, and OECD to
examine these issues.
Statement, G-7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, supra note
199.
220 See OECD Guidance on Sovereign Wealth Funds, supra note 200.
221 See OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Protecting
freedom of investment at the OECD, http://www.oecd.org/document/7/
0,3343,en26493488737363207 1 1 1 1,00.html (last visited Apr. 11,
2010).
222 Id.
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countries-its efforts being to promote progressive investment
practices of non-discrimination, liberalization, transparency and
strengthened the "peer monitoring" of country development23
The umbrella component of the OECD SWF Report that was
presented to the IMFC on October 8, 2008 was a "Declaration on
Sovereign Wealth Funds and Recipient Country Policies" that had
been issued previously by the OECD Ministerial Council on June 5,
2008.224 This declaration recognized that there were "legitimate
national security concerns" if SWF investments "were motivated by
political rather than commercial objectives. '225 It also welcomed the
"constructive contribution that [SWFs] make to the development of
home and host countries" and emphasized that SWFs to date "have
been reliable, long-term, commercially-driven investors and a force
for global financial stability. 2 26 It then connected the OECD's best
practices efforts with those of the IMF and embraced the OECD
Investment Committee's April 2008 Report on Recipient Coun-
221tries. It also extended a set of investment principles to SWFs that
are consistent with OECD's general investment policies and pri-
nciples. 228 Accompanying the Declaration and as part of the OECD
SWF Report were statements on the "OECD General Investment
Policy Principles, 229 on "OECD Guidelines for Recipient Country
223 id.
224 id.
225 Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., Message by the OECD Secretary-
General, supra note 218, at 2.
226 Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., Message by the OECD Secretary-
General, supra note 218, at 2.
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 Id. The OECD investment principles are rooted in the OECD's 1961
Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements and Declaration on Inter-
national Investment and Multinational Enterprises and related Decisions,
Including National Treatment 1976-2000. See generally ORG. FOR ECON.
Co-OPERATION & DEV., OECD CODE OF LIBERALISATION OF CAPITAL
MOVEMENTS (2009), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/62/
39664826.pdf, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., NAT'L
TREATMENT FOR FOREIGN-CONTROLLED ENTERS.: INCLUDING ADHERING
COUNTRY EXCEPTIONS TO NAT'L TREATMENT (2009), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/21/1954854.pdf; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV., THE OECD DECLARATION & DECISIONS ON INT'L INV.
& MULTINATIONAL ENTERS.: BASIC TEXTS (2000), available at http://
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Investment Policies Relating to National Security, '230 and on the FOI
process. 231 The OECD SWF Report to the IMFC was not based
solely upon input from the thirty OECD members, but also from a
broader group of non-members including Brazil, China, Russia and
South Africa.2 32
Also, it should not be forgotten that in the G7 Finance
Ministers October 2007 mandate, the World Bank was specifically
included as one of the IFI collaborators in the SWF best practices
process, though (unlike with the IMF and OECD) the Bank was
given no specific task. 33 Exactly why Secretary Paulson and the
Treasury, the G7 Finance Ministers and the IMFC thought that the
Bank was necessary to this process is unclear. Yet the Bank's
involvement would seem to make sense for a variety of reasons,
which could include: many of the SWFs are from developing
countries; 234 a number of SWFs have been and will be investing in
developing countries;235 the Bank has extensive technical assistance
www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2000doc.nsf/LinkTo/NT00002BE6/$FILE/0008574
3.PDF.
230 Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., Message by the OECD Secretary-
General, supra note 218, at 4-5. These principles are of much more recent
vintage, being derived from the May 25, 2009 OECD Council
Recommendation, adopting these general Guidelines. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV., GUIDELINES FOR RECIPIENT COUNTRY INVESTMENT
POLICIES RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY: RECOMMENDATIONS
ADOPTED BY THE OECD COUNCIL ON 25 MAY 2009, at 2 (2009), available
at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/ 11/35/43384486.pdf. National security was
a large concern in the development of these guidelines. Id.
231 Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., Message by the OECD Secretary-
General, supra note 218, at 6.
232 Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., OECD Guidance on Sovereign
Wealth Funds, http://www.oecd.org/document/19/0,3343,en 2649_34887_
41807059 1 1 1 1,00.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2010).
233 See Guebert, supra note 184.
234 Eighteen of the twenty-six IWG SWF countries are developing countries.
See generally supra note 17.
235 See, e.g., Press Release, United Nations Conference on Trade and Dev.,
Sovereign Wealth Funds Beginning to Play Major Role in Foreign Direct
Inv. Through Mergers & Acquisitions (Sept. 24, 2008) available at
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/webflyer.asp?docid-I 0478&intltem ID 1
465&lang 1.
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("TA") expertise (including providing TA to SWFs);236 and over the
past decade there has been a trend for greater IMF-World Bank
collaboration in the areas of TA, country consultations and program
assessments.2 37
In the SWF best practices process, the World Bank generally
stayed on the sidelines as to the policy debate. As noted above, 231 it
was a "permanent observer" as to the IWG, but there does not seem
to be any reported express, specific Bank input. This being said, the
Bank's President has been promoting his concept of a "One-percent
Solution," whereby SWFs would commit to invest one percent of
their equity holdings in Africa.239
2. The Santiago Principles (GAPP) as
Substance
240
While the OECD SWF Report was built largely upon pre-
existing OECD reports, practices and processes, the IMF-IWG's
efforts to produce its set of "best practices" came from whole cloth.
These efforts, however, were not embarked upon in isolation. Not
only were twenty-nine SWFs from twenty-six countries members of
the IMF, input was also sought from a group of key recipient
countries, the World Bank, the OECD and European Commission.
241
236 See Posting of James Seward, Should There Be Common Standards for
Sovereign Wealth Funds in Asia? (Feb. 26, 2008, 12:30), http://blogs.world
bank.org/eastasiapacific/comment/reply/2801.
237 See, e.g., INT'L MONETARY FUND & WORLD BANK, STRENGTHENING
IMF-WORLD BANK COLLABORATION ON COUNTRY PROGRAMS AND
CONDITIONALITY (2001), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
PROJECTS/Resources/imf-wb-conditionalityO8-22-0 1.pdf.
238 See supra note 17.
239 See Press Release, The World Bank, Sovereign Wealth Funds Should
Invest in Africa, supra note 8.
240 See SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 18. The acronym GAPP is merely
the initials for "generally accepted principles and practices," emphasizing
that the documents has been "generally accepted" by the participating
parties" and is an amalgam of principles and practices. The pronunciation of
this acronym somewhat confusing sounds like the U.S, accounting industry
term of "generally accepted accounting principles." This confusion perhaps
is not all that bad as GAAP refers to the framework of financial accounting
principles and rules applicable to major business entities-not a bad analogy
for the SWF GAPP.
241 See id. at 2.
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In this sense, the IWG "Secretariat" (i.e., the IMF acting in this
informal capacity) made efforts to seek as much knowledge as it
could about the existing practices of the SWFs and about recipient
country concerns, and to build the "best practices" on this knowledge
base. Additionally, the IWG-IMF, to avoid the perception of a top-
down process, sought to engage the SWFs and recipient countries in
a collaborative manner.242
The GAPP were designed to be a "voluntary set of principles
and practices., 243 They were conceived of as voluntary for a variety of
reasons. The IWG is an informal, ad hoc and self-generated body that
has no formal legal authority. The SWFs, at the end of the day, would
244be subject to the law and practical control of the home country. This
effort in bringing together the SWFs within an international forum or
grouping was totally "new territory." Goodwill and mutual benefit
would drive the integration of participating parties and their home
countries. Yet, the process was never fully voluntary, as it was to
operate within a complex of considerable overt and latent pressures
from the U.S. Treasury, the G7 (and now the G20) and the IMFC.
While none of these latter parties could exert any formal authority
over the SWFs and their home countries, the pressures on the SWFs,
their home countries and on the recipient countries to participate
constructively and in good faith were considerable.
Once the SWFs bought into the overall process and became
more comfortable with the other involved parties, a sense of "club
law" began to develop, or at least an aura of influencing peer/group
245
pressure. While recognizing differences in the stages of evolution of
the various SWFs and the need to allow for transitional arrangements
and some necessary variances, the end goal of the process was not a
"cafeteria style" set of principles and practices but rather a common
set of "generally agreed" principles derived from the practices of the
242 See WORK AGENDA, supra note 4, at 4.
243 See SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, at 5.
244 See id. at 5.
245 The concept of "peer group review" is implied in the GAPP in GAPP
Principle 24, as developed in the Kuwait Declaration. See International
Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, "Kuwait Declaration," supra
note 19; see also discussion infra subsection 3 (stating that the purpose of
the forum "will operate in an inclusive manner and facilitate communication
among SWFs.").
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SWFs and embraced by all the endorsing parties. As a corollary, the
Santiago Principles process is sui generis, as it does not create a
conventional "self-regulatory" regime, system of private-regulation or
a code of conduct due to the mix of participants and to the complex
set of overriding pressures referred to above. At best, the environment
would be quasi-self regulatory or self-regulatory in a very constrained
247manner.
Because the GAPP are designed as "principles" and not detailed
rules, a knee-jerk reaction would be to then consider the set of best
practices as purely aspirational or even "fluff." Such a view would not
do justice to the GAPP. First, the document is intended to serve as a
"framework" within which more detailed rules would evolve over
time; that is, a work in progress but with a direction. 48 Second, the
GAPP's twenty four main "Principles 2 49 cover the key SWF areas in
a relatively comprehensive manner: Part A covers "Legal Framework,
Objectives and Coordination with Macroeconomic Policies; 250 Part B
addresses "Institutional Framework and Governance Structure ;,,52
1
Part C touches upon "Investment and Risk Management Frame-
work;, 252 and the twenty fourth Principle speaks to ongoing issues as
to "Implementation.", 53 In addition, in Appendix 1, the GAPP present
an agreed definition of an SWF with explanatory notes; Appendix ii
identifies the list and the representatives of the IWG members
(including permanent observers) and of the participating recipient
countries; Appendix III presents summary information of each of the
participating SWFs; and a list of key SWF references is set forth at the
end of the document.254
The two core elements of disclosure and accountability
permeate the Principles. For example, public disclosure is suggested
241 See SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, at 6 ("[T]he GAPP is
formulated broadly enough so that underlying principles and practices can
be accommodated in different institutional, constitutional, and legal settings
in various countries.").
247 Cf. RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS: SELF GOVERNANCE AND LAW 1N
TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS (Olaf Dilling et al. eds. 2008).
248 See SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, at 4-6.
249 See, e.g., SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, at 7-9 (listing the
Santiago Principles, some of which have Subprinciples).
250 SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, at 11 (Principles 1-5).
251 Id. at 15 (Principles 6-17).
252 Id. at 20 (Principles 18-23).
253 Id. at 20 (Principle 24).
254 [d. at 27-49.
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for SWF sources of funds, purposes, legal structure, governance
structure, investment policy, general approach to risk management
and ownership rights. 55 In a general sense, this represents an SWF
group sensitivity to pursue a culture of openness and transparency
with respect to owners, recipient countries and relevant regulators.
However, it is clear from the heterogeneous nature of the SWFs that
the different stages of development and the different investment
strategies that give effective meaning to disclosure and its implemen-
tation will face considerable definitional, operational and policy
tensions with respect to the various types of disclosure that should be
made, the adequacy of the various disclosures, the recipients of
specific disclosures, and the timing of the specific disclosures.2 56
These will not be easy issues for the SWFs and the ISWF Forum to
address and it will have to be done over time and after much ongoing
consultation and "trust-building.,
257
With respect to accountability, the GAPP provides: "The
accountability framework for the SWF's operations should be clearly
defined in the relevant legislation, charter, other constitutive docu-
ments, or management agreement., 258 Further the SWF's "governance
framework" should "facilitate accountability and operational indepen-
,,259dence. In addition, an SWF annual performance and operational
report with accompanying financial statements, "prepared in a timely
fashion and in accordance with recognized international or national
accounting standards in a consistent manner," is required. 6 ° In a
practical sense, this opens the door to the major global accounting
firms to take a role in shaping these "standards" for the SWFs. 
61
Moreover, the GAPP provide for clearly defined "professional and
255 Id. at 12, 14, 17, 19-22, 24. (Subprinciple 1.2, Principle 2, Subprinciples
4.1 and 4.2, Principle 5 (as to owners), Principles 11, 15-17, Subprinciple
18.3, Subprinciple 19.1, Principle 21 and Subprinciple 22.2).
256 See, e.g., NAT'L UNIV. OF SINGAPORE FACULTY OF LAW & ASIAN SoC'Y
OF INT'L LAW, CONFERENCE REPORT, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: Gov-
ERNANCE AND REGULATION 3 (2009), available at http://law.nus.edu.sg/
asiansil/conference/sovereignwealth/doc/SWF%2OReport FINAL.pdf.
257 See, e.g., id.
258 See SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, at 17 (Principle 10).
259 Id. at 15 (Principle 6).
260Id. at 17-18 (Principles I I and 12).
261 Cf Deloitte, Minding the GAPP: Sovereign Wealth, Transparency, and
the "Santiago Principles" 12 (2008), http://www.iasplus.com/dttpubs/0811
sovereignwealth.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2010).
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ethical standards . . . [for] the SWFs, ' ' 2 6 2 and for SWF compliance
"with all applicable regulatory and disclosure requirements of the
countries in which they operate. 263 Of significance to the issue of
accountability, the GAPP contemplate SWF self-assessments and
even possibly peer review. 264 Again, this notion of self-assessment
and review invites the intervention of external consultants to assist in
the assessment process and, thus, to help shape the process itself.
265
What is perhaps most significant about the GAPP is that each of
the Principles is accompanied by an "Explanation and commentary"
that endeavors to develop and to interpret the substantive issues
related to each Principle. This approach is intended to provide general
principles and practices that "are potentially achievable by countries
at all levels of economic development. ' '266 In going forward with the
ISWF Forum process, the Forum should find this attribute of the
GAPP most helpful. The GAPP should not be considered a final
product, but rather a starting point in an ongoing dialogue concerning
SWFs and their role in the international financial and economic
systems. For the more established SWFs, the GAPP should serve
more as minimum best practices; for the newer and less-developed
SWFs, the GAPP should be considered targets to be achieved within a
practical and foreseeable timeframe.267
The Principles come with a statement of "Objectives and
Purpose," a sort of preamble. While some may have a misplaced
impression that such a statement is largely extraneous to the overall
document, the statement provides the policy context upon which the
Principles are based and by which they can be interpreted and
developed further. The GAPP's "guiding objectives" for the SWFs
are:
i. To help maintain a stable global financial system
and free flow of capital and investment;
262 See SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, at 18 (Principle 13).
263 Id. at 19 (Principle 15).
264 Id. at 25 (commentary and explanation to Principle 24).
265 See, e.g., AFSHIN MEHRPOUYA, CHAONI HUANG & TIMOTHY BARNETT,
IRRC INSTI. & RISKMETRICS GROUP, AN ANALYSIS OF PROXY VOTING &
ENGAGEMENT POLICIES & PRACTICES OF THE SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS
97 (2009), available at http://www.irrcinstitute.org/pdf/Sovereign Wealth
Funds Report-October 2009.pdf.
261 See SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, at 5.
267 Id. at 5-6.
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ii. To comply with all applicable regulatory and
disclosure requirements in the countries in which
they invest;
iii. To invest on the basis of economic and financial
risk and return-related considerations; and
iv. To have in place a transparent and sound gover-
nance structure that provides for adequate opera-
tional controls, risk management, and account-
ability.268
The primary "purpose of the GAPP is to identify a framework of
generally accepted principles and practices that properly reflect
appropriate governance and accountability arrangements as well as
the conduct of investment practices . . . on a prudent and sound
basis. 269 Moreover, the GAPP "aims to contribute to the stability of
the global financial system, reduce protectionist pressures, and help
maintain an open and stable investment climate. 2 70
Thus, the GAPP are designed to foster prudent and sound
SWFs while contributing to desired global economic and financial
objectives. From the U.S. Treasury's initial attempts to achieve some
rather limited and immediate objectives, the IWG-ISWF Forum
process has evolved into a relatively mature (though still evolving)
scheme that entails broad micro- and macro-economic objectives that
have come to the forefront as a result of the GFC. Of note, the
Santiago Principles have been referred to by the European
Commissioner's representative to the IWG as a "public good":
271
The principles and practices of the GAPP amount to
a global public good that can help foster trust and
confidence between sovereign wealth funds, their
originating countries, and the recipient countries.
This is what we need in these turbulent times: a
strong commitment to enhance mutual trust and
268 Id. at 4.
269 id.
270 Id.
271 IMF Survey online, IMF Intensifies Work on Sovereign Wealth Funds,
INT'L MONETARY FUND, Mar. 4, 2008, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
survey/so/2008/po103408a.htm.
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maintain and preserve an open investment
environment.
272
While not precipitated by the GFC, the IWG-ISWF Forum process
has the capacity to become one component (albeit somewhat tangen-
tial) to the Bretton Woods Ii overall approach to global financial
stability, market integrity and economic openness.
3. The IWG-ISWF Forum as Process
As good lawyers come to realize, the efficacy of law ("hard"
or "soft") is dependent on the quality of the related procedures
(processes).273 Certainly, it is premature to denote the GAPP as "soft
law" or "soft administrative regulation," but it is clear that the ISWF
process-particularly in light of the subsequent April 2009 Kuwait
Declaration, the establishment of the permanent ISWF Forum and a
permanent Forum Secretariat-has been transformed into an ongoing
and sophisticated procedural construct within which the Santiago
Principles and the OECD "best practices" can be further developed,
monitored and assessed.
As to the actual IWG-ISWF Forum process at the moment,
the IWG at its April 6, 2009 meeting in Kuwait City announced (the
so-called Kuwait Declaration) the formation of the ISWF Forum, a
"voluntary" group of SWFs whose primary purpose is "to meet,
exchange views on issues of common interest, and facilitate an
understanding of the Santiago Principles and SWF activities. ' 2 75 The
272 See Press Release, IWG-SWF, Statement by the European Commissioner
on the Santiago Principles (Oct. 11, 2008) (available at http://www.iwg-
swf.org/pr/swfprO8O8.htm); see also IMF Survey online, supra note 271.
273 Cf the classic article: Edson R. Sunderland, An Inquiry Concerning the
Functions of Procedure in Legal Education, 21 MICH. L. REv. 372, 372-92
(1923) (emphasizing the importance of teaching procedure in law school).
274 See supra Part IV.A-B.2. On the Kuwait Declaration, see International
Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds, supra note 19.
275 International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, supra note 19.
The IWG-ISWF Forum also offered an expanded version of its purpose:
The Forum will act as a platform for:
1-exchanging ideas and views among SWFs and with
other relevant parties. These will cover, inter alia, issues
such as trends and developments pertaining to SWF
activities, risk management, investment regimes, market
and institutional conditions affecting investment opera-
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Declaration not only stresses the "voluntary character" of this new
Forum but also that "[t]he Forum shall not be a formal supranational
authority and its work shall not carry any legal force." '2 76 While it is
understandable why the Forum members would wish to make such
qualifications, the reality is that the Forum does represent a "global
community" of SWFs that has come about through the mandate of
the G7, G20 and IMFC, and that remains accountable to the G20 and
IMFC. Further, though SWFs are commercial investors, they remain
controlled, directly or indirectly, by their home country governments,
and these governments maintain some level of accountability through
the G20 and/or IMFC.
In terms of the Forum's structure, it will be developed as an
"inclusive" body, open to all entities meeting the SWF definition
under the Santiago Principles and agreeing to accept and foster those
Principles.277 In addition, it appears that the Forum is willing to
continue, from its predecessor IWG, the practice of offering "perma-
nent observer" and possibly other forms of "associate" status.2 78
More generally, the ISWF Forum will not only be a vehicle for
facilitating communication and an exchange of views among its
members and their respective governments, but will also open up
communication among recipient country officials, representatives
such as the OECD and World Bank and even with the private
sector.27 9
tions, and interactions with the economic and financial
stability framework;
2 sharing views on the application of the Santiago
Principles including operational and technical matters;
and
3-encouraging cooperation with investment recipient
countries, relevant international organizations, and capital
market functionaries to identify potential risks that may
affect cross-border investments, and to foster a non-
discriminatory, constructive and mutually beneficial
investment environment.
276 International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, supra note 19.
277 International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, supra note 19.
271 See id.
279 See Jukka Pihlman, Sovereign Funds Set Up Permanent Representative
Forum, IMF SURV. MAG., May 6, 2009, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/
ft/survey/so/2009/NEW050609A.htm.
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The ISWF will maintain a professional secretariat, with the IMF
agreeing to serve initially in this capacity. 280 The head of the
Australian SWF will serve as the initial Chair of the Forum, with
Deputy Chairs drawn from the Chinese and Kuwaiti funds.28 1 The
Forum also may establish "subgroups" that consist of "Forum
members and external experts with a proven record and expertise as
determined by the Forum. 282 It appears there will initially be three
subgroups, and they will work on "application of the Santiago
Principles; investment and risk management practices; and the inter-
national investment environment and recipient country relationships,
,,28 3including cross-border investment regime issues. In addition to
assisting in orchestrating the IWG process, the IMF has also been
conferring regularly with the major SWFs on a bilateral basis as part
284of its "surveillance" role in the global economy.
Perhaps somewhat overstated, yet nevertheless significant,
H.E. Mustafa J. AI-Shimali, Chairman of the Kuwaiti SWF and
Kuwait's Minister of Finance, has commented that the Santiago
Principles are based on "an innovative, postmodern approach to
global governance. 285 It appears he was referring to a system of
"peer review" to which member SWFs have committed them-
selves.286 How this "self-regulatory" process will work remains to be
seen, but this sort of process is not without precedent in the
287international financial arena. However this ISWF Forum "peer
review" process unfolds, it will not be a purely internal process but,
instead, will be part of a process that includes the "global
community" of SWF interests.
2 80 id.
281 id.
282 International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, supra note 19.
283 Pihlman, supra note 279.
284 WORK AGENDA, supra note 4, at 5, 17.
285 Press Release, Int'l Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds,
Working Group Announces Creation of International Forum of Sovereign
Wealth Funds (Apr. 6, 2009) available at http://iwg-swf.org/pr/swfpr
0901 .htm.
286 Id.
287 See generally Douglas W. Amer & Michael W. Taylor, The Global
Financial Crisis and the Financial Stability Board: Hardening the Soft Law
of International Financial Regulation? (Asian Inst. of Int'l Fin. Law,
Working Paper No. 6, 2009), available at http://papers.ssmn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id- 1427084.
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In order to root the IWG-ISWF Forum in an incipient
framework of legitimacy, accountability and transparency (the trilogy
of criteria by which SWF regulation should be evaluated) that is
capable of maturing over time, one first should identify the
framework's "constituencies" or "stakeholders" and then closely
assess each of these three criteria in relation to each constitu-
ent/stakeholder-a rather daunting task that is outside the scope of
this article. 288 However, purely on a preliminary observational basis,
it appears that the possible constituents/stakeholders are quite
numerous. For example, because SWFs are directly or indirectly
controlled by governments-or more specifically, by organs of
governments-the respective controlling governmental bodies are
primary constituents, though any evaluation could vary depending on
the nature of the governmental organ as well as the degree, level and
source of governmental control being exercised. 28 9 Going a step
further, subject to the level of democratic culture, transparency
and/or the attitudes of a taxpaying public in a particular home
country, the home country citizenry may reasonably be considered to
be a constituent group. In addition, SWFs may have significant
relationships with investors and counterparties other than their home
states, such as co-venturers, affiliates, creditors, swap parties and
others. Such parties might possibly be comprised of SOEs, other
SWFs, private or government-owned banks, investment firms, hedge
28" As mentioned above regarding Truman's Blueprint for SWFs, supra note
83, initial attempts have been made to assess the legal and governance
structures of SWFs relating to their investment policies and operation. In
fact, on the basis of his thirty three element assessment scheme, Truman has
preliminarily evaluated the Santiago Principles-GAPP, giving the
Principles a "score" of seventy-four (within rating of the top half of the
forty-six SWFs he originally assessed). Edwin R. Truman, Peterson Institute
for International Economics, Real Time Economic Issues Watch: Making
the World Safe for Sovereign Wealth Funds (Oct. 14, 2008), http://
www.petersoninstitute.org/realtime/?p- 105.
289 For example, Temasek was established as an autonomously and
professionally managed investment house under an independent board, the
Norwegian government's pension fund was set up in a manner that
separates politics from operational functions, and the CIC has a special
statutory mandate. For consideration of the different structures of the
Forum's member SWFs, including the three just mentioned, see SANTIAGO
PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, app. 3 at 31-49. As an aside, the Forum might be
able to serve as a buffer and communication vehicle between the funds and
their respective governments.
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funds, private equity funds or other "shadow banks," each of which
will have differing expectations and risk-protection requirements of
any particular SWF.
Further, the recipient countries have separate constituent/
stakeholder interests from the entities in which the SWF may invest
by debt or equity. Moreover, as discussed above, SWFs, as a group,
290have become major players in global capital markets, which means
that the markets will (or should) require a sufficient level of sound
governance structures and transparency in order to protect the
market's integrity and other market players and investors. Thus,
those private and public bodies responsible for the orderly and sound
functioning of the global capital markets might be considered
constituents/stakeholders. In addition, as most of the financial funds
supporting an SWF will come from a government's excess external
reserves or other sources of governmental funds, special govern-
mental policy concerns may arise in areas like monetary and gov-
ernment safety nets; thus, the relevant government bodies responsible
for those areas may also have a stakeholder's interest. 291 Also, over
the past two years since the IWG-ISWF Forum process commenced,
it has become apparent to the IMF and the G20, that the SWFs
themselves, the EU and others in the international community that
the SWFs have a relationship to the global goals of sustainable
290 See supra notes 4, 34 and accompanying text.
291 Cf Donghyun Park, Capital Outflows, Sovereign Wealth Funds, and
Domestic Financial Instability in Developing Asia (Asian Dev. Bank Econs.
Working Paper Series, Paper No. 129, 2008) (detailing that Asian SWFs,
which are largely funded by central bank reserves of foreign exchange,
represent a shift in investing those reserves into higher-risk higher-return
investments resulting in downside risks for the region's commercial banks,
which implies that the central banks also carry downside risk as they are the
governmental bodies responsible for maintaining the monetary safety net
that is critical for the success of their countries' commercial banks);
Razanov, supra note 53. In this respect, "government" should not be viewed
as a unitary construct but as differing governmental bodies with different
policy objectives and concerns that may be impacted by the conduct of
SWFs.
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financial stability.29 2 Accordingly, those bodies responsible for global
financial stability (e.g., the G20, the IMF and FSB) could be viewed
as having constituent or stakeholder interests. Additionally, since
most of the main SWFs have now confirmed a permanent grouping
in the form of the ISWF Forum, the various SWF members,
permanent observers and even non-member SWFs have constituent/
stakeholder interests.
Thus, there is a broad and complex array of possible consti-
tuents and stakeholders who, ideally, will need to be accommodated
by having the ISWF Forum provide a viable, ongoing, administra-
tive-type process for monitoring, evaluating and supporting the
SWFs. In light of this, quite remarkably and without any real all-
encompassing or coordinated policy forethought, many of the
possible constituents appear already to have been interconnected in
some manner with the enhanced ISWF Forum process. From a top-
down perspective, there are the G20 Finance Ministers and Leaders,
the IMF and its IMFC, and the OECD and the World Bank-all of
which were initially brought into the process and all remaining a part
of the process.293 Within the Forum, partially within the G20 and the
OECD (but all within the membership of the IMFC and the World
292 See, e.g., SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, at 3; see also Press
Release, IWG-SWF, supra note 272. Further, note the so-called "Baku
Statement" issued at the ISWF Forum's (IFSWF's) inaugural meeting in
Baku, Azerbaijan on October 8-9, 2009:
We welcome the international efforts aimed at main-
taining supportive fiscal, monetary, and financial sector
policies until a durable recovery is secured; completion of
the financial sector and regulatory reforms without delay,
and avoidance of protectionism in all its forms. To sup-
port this global commitment and to live up to its
objectives, the IFSWF agrees to: (i) encourage recipient
countries to continue making their investment regimes
more transparent and nondiscriminatory, avoid protec-
tionism, and foster a constructive and mutually beneficial
investment environment; (ii) continue to assess the
application of the Santiago Principles; (iii) continue to
place emphasis on adequate operational controls, risk
management, and accountability; and (iv) encourage
capacity building among IFSWF members.
Int'l Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds, Sovereign Wealth Funds Issue
"Baku Statement" Reaffirming the Need for Maintaining Open Inv. Env't
(Oct. 9, 2009) (available at http://www.ifswf.org/pr/pr2.htm).
293 See supra Part IV.B. 1-2.
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Bank) the relevant SWF home country governments and the key
recipient countries are interconnected with the process. Also, linked
to the IMF and the G20 Finance Ministers, the ISWF Forum is
positioned to be linked further to most of the key institutions that are
concerned with global financial stability issues. With the con-
siderable publicity and published reports and hearings devoted to the
SWF phenomena over the past two years, the awareness of the
citizenry in the key home and recipient countries regarding these
issues has been significantly enhanced. Moreover, with the global
accounting and consulting firms' involvement with the major SWFs,
an indirect connection with the actual financial markets and their
standards, requirements and practices is being forged. But this latter
connection to the financial markets (particularly the capital markets)
remains tenuous and incomplete.
V. Concluding Observations: The ISWF Forum Process-
Quo Vadis?
In the two-year (2007-2009) ad hoc saga involving the SWFs
and the IWG-ISWF Forum processes reviewed and analyzed in this
article, we see a curious, initially unplanned and largely disjointed
pattern of "multilevel global governance" among major national and
regional actors (e.g., the U.S. Treasury and the European Commis-
sion) triggered by a concern regarding a possible "Bretton Woods II"
subject-matter (i.e., the rise of the SWFs). The U.S. largely dealt with
this concern domestically through the efforts of then Secretary of the
Treasury Hank Paulson and the Treasury Department. Paulson in
turn placed this issue squarely on the G7 (and subsequently the G20)
Ministerial and Leaders levels and the IMF's International Monetary
and Financial Committee ("IMFC"), with the G7/20 Ministers and
Leaders and the IMFC providing the direction and delegating follow-
up responsibilities to the IMF, the World Bank and the OECD.294 In
this process, the concerns for the SWFs were brought within (or at
294 As mentioned elsewhere in this article, Secretary Paulson's initial
concerns for the SWF (and more specifically the CIC) do not appear to be
systemic in nature or truly global in policy scope. He was more concerned
with heading off possible or probable domestic resistance to the SWFs and
their investment in the U.S.
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least to the edges of) the G20 "Bretton Woods II Action Plan" for
restructuring the global financial architecture in light of the GFC.
295
In effect, what this ad hoc and sui generis process generated
is a working "global policy network" in the form of the IWG-ISWF
Forum comprised of twenty-six SWFs (twenty-three as members and
three as permanent observers). This group of SWFs collaborated with
the IMF, the OECD, the World Bank and the key recipient countries
in formulating a set of international standards/best practices-a
"global public good"-in the Santiago Principles and in establishing
the structure of the ISWF Forum as a nascent, ongoing vehicle and
process for continuing communication, monitoring and evolution of
the SWF grouping. What is unique in this situation is that this
emerging "global policy network" not only affects the subject SWFs,
but also the home government entities (most often accountable to the
respective Ministries of Finance and Central Banks, some of whom
themselves are also members of the G7 Ministers and/or the IMFC)
that effectively control these SWFs. The network now centers around
the agreement/consensus arrived at with respect to their own
operational "international standards" (the Santiago Principles-
GAPP). Tangentially, the OECD, in collaboration with this grouping,
has compiled its own "Guidelines" for the recipient countries as to
their treatment of SWF investments.
So where does this "global policy network" go from here, as
the "heat" appears to have been taken away from the SWF
phenomenon and as the GFC appears to have bottomed out?2 96 There
are the possibilities (1) that the SWF issue may become marginalized
295 See generally Declaration, G20 Leaders, Summit on Financial Markets
and the World Economy (Nov. 15, 2008) (available at http://www.
g20.org/Documents/g20_summit declaration.pdf). This was followed up in
subsequent Declarations, Communiques and Reports by the G20 Leaders
and Finance Ministers at the April, 2, 2009 London G20 (Leaders) Summit
and more recently at the September 25, 2009 G20 (Leaders) meeting in
Pittsburgh. See G20 Publications, http://www.g20.org/pub communiques.
aspx (last visited Jan. 24, 2010).
296 See, e.g., Posting of Adam 0. Emmerich, Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz,
Sovereign Wealth Funds Adopt Voluntary Best Practices, Harvard Law
School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation (Nov. 1,
2008, 12:49 p.m.), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2008/ 1/01/
sovereign-wealth-funds-adopt-voluntary-best-practices/ ("Despite the great
uncertainty of the current environment, the Santiago Principles represent a
positive step toward depoliticizing SWF investing and disarming potential
political confrontation with SWFs and their sovereign sponsors.").
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as the G20, the IMF and others involved have to cope with broader
and more fundamental matters dealing with restructuring of the
global economy and financial system; or (2) that the SWFs (or at
least certain of them) may retract from pushing the ISWF Forum
process forward and return to "business as usual. 297 Hopefully,
neither will be the case.
I would suggest that-in the interest of the SWFs themselves
and their home countries, the recipient countries, the global financial
markets, and the long-term stability of the global financial system-
the ISWF Forum process should continue to mature and become a
proactive, contributing component to the new "Bretton Woods II"
global financial architecture. How can this be brought about? Let me
make six modest suggestions:
First, the ISWF Forum needs to have a serious institutional
and individual member commitment to ensuring that the Forum
becomes a more inclusive body and that it takes the leading role in
helping, over time, to enhance standards of greater transparency,
better corporate governance and higher levels of accountability for
the SWF community.
Second, the Forum needs fully to recognize and appreciate
that the SWFs are already major players in global capital markets and
that this position as to these markets and to the broader global
financial system will be magnified in coming years. All of this will
have significant implications for the sound functioning and integrity
of the markets and for the stability of the financial system. As such,
the Forum should seek further links to the financial markets and to
the global policymakers responsible for global financial stability. In
this regard, the Forum should seek close ties through "affiliate"
status 298 with the International Organization of Securities Commis-
sions ("IOSCO"), the international standard-setter in the securities
297 It needs to be kept in mind that the SWFs were never viewed as
contributing to the causes of the GFC. Further, certain SWFs and home
countries such as Saudi Arabia have never been overly enthusiastic about
the IWG-ISWF Forum process and remain only "permanent observers."
298 IOSCO has three levels of membership: ordinary, associate and affiliate.
Affiliate members, of which there are seventy-two bodies, include stock
exchanges, an array of private financial groupings and various international
and regional organizations. There are 110 ordinary members representing
domestic securities authorities and 11 associate members comprising other
securities authorities. See IOSCO Membership and Committees Lists,
http://www.iosco.org/lists/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2010) (follow "Ordinary,"
"Associate," or "Affiliate" hyperlinks).
Vol. 29
2009-2010 "SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES" & SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 527
299law area. Since the SWFs are one of the dominant capital market
participants, it will be increasingly important for the Forum to take
an active role in the IOSCO process and to interact with the various
levels of IOSCO members.
Third, the major concern with the GFC was its non-
transparent interconnectedness and counterparty arrangements that
had proliferated among the banks and the "shadow bank" sector.
Looking forward, these interconnections will most likely continue,
though on a more transparent and risk-managed basis. It appears that
the SWFs will be joining, at times, with other SWFs, banks and non-
bank financial institutions. In this context, the Forum should consider
being more openly and actively involved with the private players in
the capital markets by associating and exchanging views with the
major private international capital markets bodies such as the private,
self-regulatory International Capital Market Association
("ICMA"),3 °° the Hedge Fund Association30 1 and the International
Investment Fund Association.0 2
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, the G20 Finance
Ministers and the IMFC, in consultation with the Forum, should
299 The mandate of IOSCO's members is:
to cooperate together to promote high standards of
regulation in order to maintain just, efficient and sound
markets; to exchange information on their respective
experiences in order to promote the development of
domestic markets; to unite their efforts to establish
standards and an effective surveillance of international
securities transactions; [and] to provide mutual assistance
to promote the integrity of the markets by a rigorous
application of the standards and by effective enforcement
against offenses.
Media Release, Int'l Org. of Sec. Comm'ns, IOSCO Technical Committee
Statement on Accounting Standards Development and Enforcement, at 2-3
(Oct. 21, 2008) (available at http://www.iasplus.com/iosco/0810tech
committee.pdf); General Information on IOSCO, http://www.iosco.org/
about/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2010).
300 See International Capital Market Association, http://www.icmagroup.org/
(last visited Jan. 24, 2010).
'01 See The Hedge Fund Association, http://www.thehfa.org (last visited Jan.
24, 2010).
102 See International Investment Funds Association Statement of Principles,
http://www.iifa.ca/about/objectives.aspx (last visited Jan. 24, 2010).
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consider a way to fit the ISWF Forum within the newly revised
303"Bretton Woods II framework" involving the IMF and FSB.
Fifth, the Forum and its members need to be tied into and
committed to the IMF's bilateral surveillance initiatives of financial
stability analyses. In addition, the Forum should explore-with the
aid of the IMF, the World Bank and the OECD-possibilities both of
TA for assisting SWFs in upgrading their governance structures and
in some form of periodic voluntary "assessment" for SWFs. This
further involvement with the IMF would be in addition to the IMF
serving as the initial Secretariat for the Forum.
Sixth, in terms of interfacing the Forum with the FSB, one
point of commonality is that a part of the FSB's role is overseeing
international financial standards, and the Santiago Principles are de
facto now a part of such standards. In addition, the FSB's expanded
mandate is to address vulnerabilities and to develop and implement
strong regulatory, supervisory and other policies in the interest of
financial stability; 30 4 and, as discussed above, a consensus has
developed among the international policymakers and the SWFs
themselves that the SWFs have a direct relationship to global
financial stability. As such, some form of "association" should be
arranged between the FSB and the ISWF Forum. The FSB is an ideal
umbrella framework for the ISWF Forum to come under, as the FSB
includes central banks and various central bank subcommittees,
303 See Declaration, G20 Leaders, supra note 295.
304 See Financial Stability Board Overview, http://www.financialstability
board.org/about/overview.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2010). The mandate of
the FSB is to:
assess vulnerabilities affecting the financial system and
identify and oversee action needed to address them;
promote co-ordination and information exchange among
authorities responsible for financial stability; monitor and
advise on market developments and their implications for
regulatory policy; advise on and monitor best practice in
meeting regulatory standards; undertake joint strategic
reviews of the policy development work of the inter-
national standard setting bodies to ensure their work is
timely, coordinated, focused on priorities, and addressing
gaps; set guidelines for and support the establishment of
supervisory colleges; [and] manage contingency planning
for cross-border crisis management, particularly with
respect to systemically important firms; and collaborate
with the IMF to conduct Early Warning Exercises.
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financial regulators and authorities, the IMF, World Bank, OECD,
the European Commission and the various other international
standard setters (e.g., the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,
IOSCO, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors and
the International Accounting Standards Board ("IASB)).
3 0 5
The author believes that the aforementioned six suggested
private and public links can be achieved in large measure through a
series of particularized (but coordinated) MOUs between the ISWF
Forum and the relevant bodies/authorities. In part, it will be these
MOUs that will form the foundation that will help the Forum
successfully and effectively evolve into a responsible participant in
the global financial markets, the international investment
environment and the global financial stability policymaking
processes of Bretton Woods ii. The Forum's success will depend in
part upon it internally developing as a quasi-global administrative
body with a sound basis of legitimacy as to its numerous constituents
and stakeholders and with heightened institutional transparency,
good governance and accountability.
35 For the full list of the FSB members, see Links to FSB Members,
http://www.fmancialstabilityboard.org/members/links.htm (last visited Jan,
24, 2010). For further discussion of the FSB, see Amer & Taylor, supra
note 287.
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ALAN R. STERN MEMORIAL FELLOWSHIP
Staff Introduction
In April of 2008, the Review of Banking and Financial Law lost
a valued member and beloved friend. During his too-brief time at
Boston University School of Law, Alan Stern, Class of 2009, showed
a passion for utilizing his legal education for public service.
Particularly, Alan found the shortage of affordable housing in urban
areas demanded legal and regulatory attention. As a tribute to Alan,
the Stern family, in conjunction with the B.U. School of Law, the
Morin Center for Banking and Financial Law and the Review of
Banking and Financial Law, formed the Alan R. Stern Memorial
Fellowship. Through this annual program, a committee selects a B.U.
Law student to write on the topic of affordable housing. The
Fellowship funds the student's research, and the staff members of the
Review work with the author to develop, edit and publish the piece.
This is the second annual iteration of the Fellowship. Though
we all still feel sadness from the loss of Alan, we feel the Fellowship
serves as a fitting and enduring tribute to the spirit and ideals Alan
represented.

